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LAWYER INDEPENDENCE: FROM IDEAL 
TO VIABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
Kevin H. Michels† 
ABSTRACT 
When, if ever, does a lawyer have an obligation to exercise 
independent judgment? While the question drives at the deepest 
commitments of the profession, it has been left largely unexplored in 
our leading treatises on legal ethics and lawyering. Lawyers, 
scholars, and judges have waxed eloquent on the ideal of 
independence, and have despaired of its prospects of renewal in a 
competitive, market-driven profession. The courts, however, have 
offered limited guidance on the question of lawyer independence. 
Indeed, the impression that one might gain from a review of the case 
law and treatises is that lawyer independence—whatever its virtues—
is more a lost ideal than a legal requirement.  
In fact, however, Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (adopted by nearly every state) requires that lawyers 
―exercise independent professional judgment‖ in ―representing a 
client.‖ This demand raises a host of questions about the lawyer’s 
role. What is lawyer independence? If lawyers are ―agents‖ who seek 
to carry out client objectives, how can lawyer independence be 
squared with the notion of the client as decisionmaker and principal? 
Is lawyer independence enforceable, or does the paucity of cases 
construing the requirement suggest that it can never be more than an 
aspiration? Can we frame a standard that is sufficiently precise for 
lawyers to understand when they may not defer to client directives?  
                                                                                                                 
† Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, The College of New Jersey. The author 
wishes to thank Kathryn Hockenjos, John Leubsdorf, Brandon Paradise and Andrew Rothman 
for their excellent comments on drafts of this article.  
 12/30/2010 1:50:05 PM 
86 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
This Article seeks to answer those questions. In so doing, it seeks 
to develop a viable legal standard of lawyer independence grounded 
in Model Rule 2.1. The Article considers the purpose of lawyer 
independence, when it applies and when it does not, and what it 
requires of counsel. It contends that the law of lawyer independence, 
once understood, will require attorneys to revisit core assumptions 
about their role and will substantially reduce the incidence of 
wrongdoing in corporate transactions. The Article invites states to 
breathe life into a rule that has lain dormant on their books for too 
long.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When, if ever, does a lawyer have an obligation to exercise 
independent judgment? While the question drives at the deepest 
commitments of the profession, it has been left largely unexplored in 
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our leading treatises on legal ethics and lawyering.
1
 Lawyers, judges, 
and scholars have waxed eloquent on the ideal of independence and 
have despaired of its prospects of renewal in a competitive, market-
driven profession.
2
 The courts, however, have offered limited 
guidance on the question of lawyer independence.
3
 Indeed, the 
impression that one might gain from a review of the case law and 
treatises is that lawyer independence—whatever its virtues—is more 
a lost ideal than a legal requirement.  
In fact, however, Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (―Model Rules‖), adopted in nearly in every state,4 requires a 
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000) (offering 
no discussion of lawyer independence); ABA/BNA LAWYERS‘ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 31:701 to :708 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter LAWYERS‘ MANUAL] (providing limited 
treatment of lawyer independence); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE 
LAW OF LAWYERING § 23.2 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2005-2) (offering a two-paragraph account of 
rule requiring independent professional judgment).  
2 The seminal statement is from Louis Brandeis, who lamented the loss of lawyer 
―independence‖ and contended that ―[t]he leading lawyers of the United States have been 
engaged mainly in supporting the claims of the corporations; often in endeavoring to evade or 
nullify the extremely crude laws by which legislators sought to regulate the power or curb the 
excesses of corporations.‖ LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS—A 
PROFESSION 313, 322 (1914). Harold Williams, former Chairman of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, offered a similar critique, arguing that ―[t]o correct this tendency, the 
bar must place greater emphasis on the lawyer‘s role as an independent professional—
particularly, on his responsibility to uphold the integrity of his profession.‖ Harold M. Williams, 
Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 Bus. Law. 159, 165–66 (1980). Quoting speeches of 
Brandeis, Chief Justice Stone, and others, Robert Gordon observes, ―In these speeches—and 
hundreds more like them—we hear one of the great epic themes of professional rhetoric: the 
praise of independence, the fear of its decline. Though lawyers may disagree about what such 
independence entails and what threatens it, there is a remarkable consistency in the substance 
and tone of their words.‖ Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 
5–6 (1988). Scholars continue to voice concerns about the importance of the loss of lawyer 
independence. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s 
Duty of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2004) (asking whether ―competitive 
pressures of the last forty years have indeed forced the ideal of lawyer professional 
independence to the deep, almost unseen, background‖); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the 
Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 173 (2002) 
(―[T]he professional ideal of ‗independent professional judgment‘ does not inform the behavior 
of some lawyers who represent large corporations in major transactions and high-stakes 
litigation.‖); Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. 
L. REV. 217, 219 (2002) (discussing scholars‘ concerns about the decline of professionalism and 
lawyer independence).  
3 See infra notes 61–75 and accompanying text.  
4 The American Bar Association promulgated the Model Rules in 1983, and it has 
amended them frequently since, including substantial revisions in 2002, based on the 
recommendations of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(―Ethics 2000 Commission‖), chaired by Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey. CTR. FOR PROF‘L 
RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS‘N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at 
iii (6th ed. 2007). The Model Rules are the subject of our discussion because of their widespread 
adoption by the states. Forty-nine states have adopted some version of the Model Rules, often 
with amendments. See LAWYERS‘ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 01:11 to :82 (July 27, 2005) 
(summarizing how the ethics rules adopted in each state differ from the Model Rules). California 
is also considering adoption of the Model Rules. See Commission for the Revision of the Rules of 
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lawyer to exercise ―independent professional judgment‖ and provide 
―candid advice‖ in ―representing a client‖5—demands that I will refer 
to collectively as ―lawyer independence.‖6 The Rule raises a host of 
questions about the lawyer‘s role. What is lawyer independence? 
Could a demand for lawyer independence, once fully understood and 
implemented in practice, change our understanding of the attorney‘s 
role? Is lawyer independence enforceable or does the paucity of cases 
construing the requirement suggest that it can never be more than an 
aspiration?
7
 If lawyers are ―agents‖ who seek to carry out client 
objectives, how can we square a demand of lawyer independence with 
the notion of the client as decisionmaker and principal?  
The stakes are high. Consider the lawyer‘s obligations in the 
following scenarios: 
 The client consults the lawyer about consummating a 
transaction, but provides little business background on the nature and 
purpose of the transaction and discourages the attorney from learning 
more, while insisting that the attorney ―document‖ the deal.  
 The attorney suspects that the client‘s proposed transaction is 
fraudulent or criminal, but without more information has no way of 
knowing whether, in fact, it is. The client directs the attorney to 
consummate the transaction without inquiring into its propriety.  
                                                                                                                 
 
Professional Conduct, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Committees/ 
RulesCommission.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). For a review of the few state variations on 
Rule 2.1, see infra note 216.  
5 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) (―In representing a client, a lawyer 
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖). The second 
sentence of the Rule permits a lawyer to discuss moral and other considerations with the client 
as well, a question considered extensively in the legal literature. See, e.g., Larry O. Natt Gantt, 
II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal 
Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 367 (2005) (tracing the history and offering an 
interpretation of the nonlegal-considerations rule); Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal 
Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 41–48 (1997) (exploring 
the tension between personal and professional values in advising clients). Our concern in this 
Article, however, is the mandatory first sentence of the Rule. The first sentence, though largely 
overlooked by courts to date, may rank among the most important of our ethics rules because it 
offers a direct challenge to the agency conception of lawyering that dominates our 
understanding of the profession. The terms ―Model Rule 2.1‖ and ―Rule,‖ as used herein, refer 
only to the first sentence of Model Rule 2.1, unless otherwise stated.  
6 This Article considers lawyer independence from clients as distinct from the state. For 
an interesting discussion of a system that emphasizes lawyer independence from both the state 
and clients, see JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE 
1–28 (2001). 
7 See William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional 
Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1596 (2008) (concluding that 
bad legal advice undermines enforcement and vindication of the law, but leaving open ―the 
question of whether formal, coercive enforcement would be desirable‖). 
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 The client wants to engage in an action and asks the lawyer 
whether it is lawful. The lawyer sets out to find a way to characterize 
the behavior as lawful in order to help the client proceed as he wishes, 
perhaps with minor changes in the proposed behavior to make it at 
least ―arguably‖ satisfactory.  
 The client wishes to undertake a transaction that violates the law. 
He asks the lawyer to find a way to structure the transaction to satisfy 
the literal dictates of the law at the expense of what the lawyer 
concludes are the law‘s real objectives.  
While it may not be immediately apparent, each of these scenarios 
raises questions of lawyer independence. Each asks, ultimately, 
whether the attorney is best understood as an agent of the client, or 
whether her role transcends agency. The first of these examples 
implicates questions about the deliberative role of the attorney. Can 
she accept a circumscribed, limited role if the client insists, or does 
some obligation or larger interest demand a deeper involvement, 
despite the client‘s contrary directive? The second example is 
complicated by the fact that the lawyer does not know that the 
proposed transaction constitutes a crime or fraud. Does independence 
require the attorney to inquire more deeply into the facts to determine 
whether the transaction poses problems? In the third example, can the 
lawyer allow the client‘s objectives to shade her assessment of what 
the law requires? In the fourth example, must the attorney press her 
concerns on the client, or is the client‘s interest in facilitating the 
transaction and its ―literal‖ compliance reason enough for the lawyer 
to push forward with the deal?  
As the examples above make clear, questions of lawyer 
independence arise regularly in legal practice, especially in the 
counseling and transactional settings. They pose delicate questions 
regarding the balance of power in the attorney-client relationship. 
These questions have simmered just below the surface of the scandals 
that have erupted over the last few decades. The refrain ―Where were 
the lawyers?‖ has echoed through every major business scandal from 
the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s through the corporate 
scandals in the 2000s.
8
 In many of these cases, the lawyers did not ask 
questions about transactions that appeared suspicious.
9
 The Model 
                                                                                                                 
8 See, e.g., Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the Lawyer‘s 
Role in Corporate Governance—November 2006, 62 BUS. LAW. 427, 440 (2007) [hereinafter 
New York City Bar Report] (explaining that these scandals led to federal obligations on lawyers 
to report evidence of corporate wrongdoing up the corporate ladder).  
9 See, e.g., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM., BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION 17 (2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102 
rpt1.pdf (citing the absence of ―objective and critical professional advice by outside counsel‖); 
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Rules appear to encourage willful blindness by prohibiting a lawyer 
from furthering a transaction only when she knows that the 
transaction is wrongful.
10
 The knowledge standard seeks only to 
prohibit attorney complicity in a client‘s crime or fraud—an 
obligation as obvious as it is insufficient to counter client 
wrongdoing. The critical, unanswered question is whether attorneys 
have an obligation to acquire knowledge before acting, a question 
that until now has not been examined through the lens of lawyer 
independence.  
Questions about lawyer independence lie at the center of the recent 
controversy over the role of Justice Department attorneys in advising 
the Bush Administration on whether certain interrogation methods 
violated international prohibitions on torture.
11
 The questions may 
appear superficially distinct from the counseling and transactional 
questions described above, but they trace their origins to the same 
source—lawyer independence. If, as some have argued, the advice 
contained in the Justice Department memoranda was biased,
12
 may 
lawyers proceed under a ―partisan‖ view of legal counseling, in which 
their legal interpretations and advice are influenced by the client‘s 
objectives? If not, how can lawyers serve their clients—who, after all, 
retain and compensate them to fulfill client objectives? As the earlier 
examples suggest, these issues arise not only or even principally in 
the government setting. Our purpose here is not to assess the role of 
lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel scandals, but to look to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Caught in the Middle, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2007, at 84, 84 (―In this 
decade‘s first great wave of scandals, beginning with Enron Corp. and centering on fraudulent 
financial practices, the question was, ‗Where were the lawyers?‘ In-house counsel were either 
excluded from key decisions, or they failed to ask aggressive questions about whether 
problematic actions were legal or appropriate.‖); New York City Bar Report, supra note 8, at 
431–32 (―[L]awyers, either in-house or outside, appear to have been strategically positioned 
with respect to a significant number of these scandals. . . . Where questions were not asked or 
pressed, it is reasonable to believe that more assertive action might have avoided or mitigated 
wrongdoing in some of these situations.‖); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking 
the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457 
(2006) (―There is no indication that these professionals ever asked the question, ‗Is this 
misleading?‘‖). 
10 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (prohibiting lawyers from assisting a 
client ―in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent‖).  
11 See, e.g., Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of 
Justice, to the Att‘y Gen. & the Deputy Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice 68 (Jan. 5, 2010), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf [hereinafter 
Margolis Memorandum] (finding that memoranda were flawed and the result of poor judgment 
but that these deficiencies did not rise to the level of professional misconduct).  
12 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 175, 179 
(2006) (arguing that the authors twisted international law in their memoranda); Kathleen Clark, 
Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT‘L SEC. L. & POL‘Y 455, 462, 
463 (2005) (describing the legal analysis in the Bybee memorandum as ―indefensible‖).  
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foundational questions posed by lawyer independence in the lawyer-
client relationship.  
In short, this Article seeks to develop a viable theory and legal 
standard of lawyer independence grounded in Rule 2.1. While this 
Rule has been in effect in the overwhelming majority of states for 
nearly a quarter of a century,
13
 its impact on the courts and bar has 
been negligible. While a number of reasons explain the courts‘ 
neglect of this Rule,
14
 one critical barrier to its application is the 
absence of a viable account of lawyer independence—its underlying 
rationale; when it applies; what it requires of counsel; how it relates 
to the traditional role of lawyers as agents of clients; and how courts, 
disciplinary authorities, practitioners, and civil claimants might apply 
the Rule. This Article seeks to provide such an account.  
Part II sets the stage for the inquiry into independence by 
sketching the nature of the attorney-client relationship as it is 
currently conceived—with a minimal commitment to lawyer 
independence. It argues that the current conception of lawyering is 
grounded on a principal-agent model that emphasizes client control. 
Part III begins by considering the tension between the agency 
conception of lawyering and the call for lawyer independence set 
forth in Rule 2.1. It next asks why Rule 2.1 insists on lawyer 
independence in a profession otherwise committed to furthering client 
objectives, drawing on the work of David Luban.
15
 Part III then 
attempts to determine with some precision when lawyer independence 
is required—a critical question if lawyer independence is not to 
undermine client prerogatives categorically. Finally, Part III seeks to 
reconcile our commitments to agency and independence.  
Part IV leverages the insights developed in Part III into an account 
of what lawyer independence requires of counsel. It explores the 
meaning, categories, and challenges of independence, and the 
procedural and substantive elements of professional judgment. It 
argues that lawyer independence imposes critical, and heretofore 
unacknowledged, demands on counsel in the situation that is often at 
the heart of the scandals of recent decades—when attorneys have 
reason to suspect that a transaction is wrongful, even though such 
suspicion does not amount to knowledge.  
                                                                                                                 
13 By the summer of 1987, the majority of states had adopted the Model Rules with 
variations. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.15. Currently, forty-nine states have 
adopted Rule 2.1, and all but one have adopted the first sentence of the Rule without varying the 
ABA‘s proposed language. See infra note 216. 
14 See infra Part V.A.  
15 DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 153–57 (2007), discussed infra at 
notes 76, 80 and accompanying text. 
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Part V invites the states to reconsider the long-overlooked law of 
lawyer independence in both the disciplinary and liability settings. It 
also explains how the proposed standards will close a troubling gap in 
our interpretation of the Model Rules. Finally, it describes how and 
why lawyer independence differs from the law traditionally invoked 
when questions of client fraud arise—section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002
16
 and Model Rule 1.13.
17
 If states are troubled by 
the corporate scandals of recent decades and by the passivity of 
lawyers who counseled these corporations and furthered their 
transactions, the tools of reform are well within reach. States already 
insist on lawyer independence in name; it is time to insist on lawyer 
independence in practice. 
Part VI concludes with a summary of our account of lawyer 
independence and its significance for courts and practitioners.  
II. AGENCY: THE ATMOSPHERE OF ASSUMPTIONS 
Because lawyer independence has received scant attention in our 
treatises
18
 and case law,
19
 we must begin by sketching the central 
elements of the attorney-client relationship in its absence. The reading 
hardly seems controversial at first. In fact, the description that 
follows, which we term the agency or client-autonomy vision of 
lawyering, can be understood as the modern conception of the 
practice of law.
20
 While the elements of the agency vision described 
here are not false, Part III will contend that they are dangerously 
incomplete. As we shall see, the challenge is to integrate an 
understanding of lawyer independence into a view that is deeply 
ingrained in our understanding of the profession.  
A principal-agent relationship exists when one person agrees to 
―act on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s control.‖21 
Consistent with this precept, the Model Rules provide, with certain 
                                                                                                                 
16 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (setting forth professional responsibility rules for attorneys). 
17 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2009) (providing rules for the lawyer 
whose client is an organization). 
18 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
19 See infra note 61 and accompanying text.  
20 See Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 693, 717–18 (2006) (―[T]he lawyer‘s role as the client‘s agent is more than a mere legal 
obligation. It is also fully incorporated in the narrative of the profession. Taught in the law 
schools of the nation, both consciously and unconsciously, and embraced in frequent public 
tributes to the legal profession, the notion of loyalty to and zeal on behalf of clients forms the 
dominant filter through which lawyers view their work.‖) (footnotes omitted)); see also DAVID 
A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 18 (1991) 
(emphasizing the client‘s self-determination, ―autonomy, intelligence, dignity, and basic 
morality‖). 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).  
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exceptions, that the ―lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation.‖22 Principal control is a 
central precept of agency law,
23
 and within limits that we shall 
describe, it is a core precept of the agency conception of lawyering.
24
  
Most of the duties that lawyers owe to clients are mirrored in 





 duties that are imposed on 
all agents.
27
 The lawyer must keep the client informed about the 
matter and provide sufficient explanation for the client to make 
informed decisions about the matter.
28
 Again, agency law imposes a 
similar duty of communication.
29
 Consistent with agency law, lawyers 
are liable to their clients for failure to perform their services 
reasonably.
30
 The attorney-client relationship is likewise suffused 
with fiduciary duties, which derive from the responsibility and trust 
afforded to the attorney.
31
 The attorney‘s fiduciary duty of loyalty is 
reflected in the elaborate regulations on conflicts of interest,
32
 
protection of client funds,
33
 and prohibitions on using information to 
harm the client.
34
 Agency law imposes fiduciary duties as well,
35
 
                                                                                                                 
22 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a). 
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (requiring agent to comply with 
principal‘s lawful instructions).  
24 See id. § 1.01 cmt. c (noting that elements of common-law agency are present in the 
lawyer-client relationship). 
25 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3. 
26 Id. R. 1.1. 
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (requiring that an agent act with care, 
competence, and diligence). 
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.4. 
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (requiring the agent to provide facts to 
the principal if the principal so wishes or if they are material to the agent‘s duties and they can 
be provided without the agent violating a superior duty to another person). 
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (imposing liability on agent for breach 
of the duty of care); 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.13 
(2009 ed. 2009) (describing the elements of negligence claim against counsel and collecting 
case law across jurisdictions).  
31 See, e.g., In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (―[T]he attorney-client 
relationship entails one of the highest fiduciary duties imposed by law.‖); In re Cooperman, 633 
N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) (―This unique fiduciary reliance . . . is imbued with ultimate 
trust and confidence.‖); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (noting that 
trust is the ―hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000) (―A lawyer is a fiduciary . . . .‖).  
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (providing regulations on lawyers and their 
representation of current clients).  
33 E.g., id. R. 1.15(a) (providing that a lawyer must keep the funds that he is holding for a 
client separate from her own).  
34 Id. R. 1.8(b) (stating that unless informed consent is given by a client, or permitted or 
required elsewhere by the Model Rules, a lawyer may not use information relating to 
representation to the client‘s disadvantage).  
35 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (requiring agent loyalty to the 
principal). 
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requiring protection of the principal‘s property,36 prohibiting agent 
conflicts of interests,
37
 and disallowing wrongful exploitation of the 
principal‘s information.38 
In some instances, the law of lawyering imposes additional 
obligations on the lawyer beyond the general constructs of agency 
law. For example, the lawyer is required, with certain exceptions, to 
maintain in confidence information she learns from the client.
39
 While 
agency law imposes an obligation to protect the confidential 
information of the principal,
40
 the attorney‘s obligation is broader to 
satisfy demands unique to the legal setting.
41
 Even the limited 
exceptions to the attorney-confidentiality rule—allowing, for 
example, an attorney to disclose confidential information to prevent 
the client from harming a third party
42—are narrowly drawn. Under 
the Model Rules and in the overwhelming majority of states, the 
exception stops short of requiring disclosure to prevent client 
wrongdoing,
43
 despite compelling arguments that the personal safety 
of others should trump the confidentiality rights of clients. Those who 
opposed expansion of the disclosure exceptions have cited client 
loyalty—a precept of agency44—as a reason for limiting the 
exception.
45
   
                                                                                                                 
36 Id. § 8.12 (charging the agent with a duty to ensure the principal‘s property does not 
appear to be the agent‘s, a duty to ensure the principal‘s property is not mingled with that of 
others, and to perform an accounting of the principal‘s property).  
37 Id. § 8.04 (providing that the agent cannot compete with the principal or assist the 
principal‘s competitors).  
38 Id. § 8.05 (noting that an agent must not use the principal‘s property for himself or a 
third party and cannot communicate the principal‘s confidential information for his own benefit 
or the benefit of a third party without the principal‘s consent). 
39 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6.  
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2). 
41 See infra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale behind attorney 
confidentiality provisions).  
42 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (listing the six exceptions to the 
attorney confidentiality rule, one of which allows a lawyer to reveal confidential information to 
the extent she reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm).  
43 See id. (stating that an attorney may reveal confidential information in one of six 
situations). A small minority of states require an attorney to disclose information to prevent a 
client from committing a criminal act likely to result in death or bodily harm to another, 
although these remain the exception to the majority rule. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2010), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB 
_2010.pdf; ILL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2010), available at http://www.state.il.us/ 
court/supremecourt/rules/art_viii/ArtVIII_NEW.htm#1.6; N.J. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
1.6(b) (1998), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rpc97.htm#1.6; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
20:1.6(b) (2010), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/DisplayDocument.html? 
content=html&seqNo=45322#Confidentiality. 
44 See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 4, at 13–14 (3d 
ed. 2001) (discussing nature of the duty of loyalty under agency law). 
45 See, e.g., LEGAL ETHICS COMM., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON DUTIES 
OF CONFIDENTIALITY 18 (2001), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section 
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One might argue that certain restrictions imposed on attorney 
behavior render it unfair to characterize the modern conception of 
lawyering as essentially an agency role. For example, lawyers cannot 
knowingly further a client crime or fraud
46
 or knowingly deceive a 
court or a third party.
47
 Again, however, each of these limitations has 
analogues in the general conception of agency. Agents are not given 
license by dint of their agency role to commit wrongful acts.
48
 Thus, 
lawyers‘ obligations to courts and third parties are best understood 
not as departures from the core commitments of agency, but as limits 
that are imposed on all agents (including the principal) not to behave 
wrongfully.  
Even the so-called ―gatekeeping‖ reforms to the law of lawyering, 
including Sarbanes-Oxley,
49
 are narrowly framed not to intrude 
unduly on the loyalty that grounds the agency conception of 
lawyering. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, an attorney who discovers 
evidence of the company‘s ―material violation of securities law or 
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation‖ must report it to the 
company‘s chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer and, 
failing an adequate response, to an audit or independent committee of 
the board of directors or the entire board.
50
 Thus, the attorney reports 
the wrongdoing to the client, not the government. And if the reporting 
attorney fails to receive an ―appropriate response,‖ he must report 
higher within the client organization.
51
  
The Model Rules likewise require an attorney to report to a higher-
up within an organization when an officer of a corporation engages or 
is about to engage in wrongful conduct.
52
 Interestingly, the Model 
Rules allow counsel to disclose the information beyond the 
                                                                                                                 
 
=All_Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=69.  
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).  
47 Id. R. 3.3 (court); id. R. 4.1 (third parties). 
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 cmt. c (2006) (―[A]n agent has no duty 
to comply with a directive to commit a crime or an act the agent has reason to know will be 
tortious.‖).  
49 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
50 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 205.2(e) (2010) (defining ―evidence of material violation‖). 
51 If the attorney does not believe that the response is appropriate, the attorney must then 
report the material violation to the audit committee of the board of directors, to a committee of 
independent directors, or to the entire board of directors. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3). The 
attorney is permitted to, but need not, report beyond the corporation in certain instances. See 
generally William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Role of Attorneys Under Sarbanes–Oxley: The 
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee as Facilitator of Corporate Integrity, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 
439, 443 (2006) (devising a structure and procedure for monitoring corporations). 
52 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).  
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corporation only if an actor is about to engage in activity that will 
harm the client.
53
 Thus, the organization-disclosure provisions of the 
Model Rules pose no challenge to the agency vision of lawyering; 
they allow disclosure beyond the organization only in furtherance of 
client loyalty.  
In sum, an agency or client-autonomy vision characterizes much of 
the law governing lawyers. The client controls the goals of the 
representation, and the attorney owes duties of loyalty and care in 
fulfilling those goals. The constraints on lawyer behavior are likewise 
generally consistent with agency principles, and prevent the attorney 
from doing what the principal could not do on her own behalf. Even 
those rules that appear to challenge the agency conception, such as 
those allowing disclosure to prevent client wrongdoing and the 
―reporting up‖ provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and Rule 1.13, are 
narrowly framed so as not to undermine the loyalty element that 
grounds the agency conception.  
Into this symphony of provisions establishing a principal-agent 
relationship, however, the Model Rules inject the seemingly dissonant 
requirement of lawyer independence. Under Rule 2.1, the lawyer 
must ―exercise independent professional judgment‖54 in representing 
the client—a stark departure from agency law, which contains no 
such requirement.
55
 Perhaps it is not surprising that lawyers, courts, 
and commentators have yet to grasp the full significance of Rule 2.1, 
given its curious presence amid the torrent of agency obligations. 
Together, these agency principles form the ―atmosphere of 
assumptions‖56 that are so embedded in the lawyer‘s self-
understanding that they are rarely held up to the light of inspection. 
We will do so next.  
III. DEPARTING FROM AGENCY: WHY AND WHEN 
A. Introduction 
Model Rule 2.1 provides that ―[i]n representing a client, a lawyer 
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid 
advice.‖57 In requiring that the lawyer reason independently of the 
                                                                                                                 
53 Id. R. 1.13(c).  
54 Id. R. 2.1.  
55 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006).  
56 The phrase is from Franklin Burroughs, Compression Wood, 67 AM. SCHOLAR 123, 
134 (1998). In this masterful essay, Burroughs contends that regions take on an ―atmosphere of 
assumptions‖—in their history, economics, families, language and so on—that ―gradually 
becomes invisible.‖ Id. 
57 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1. 
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client, this Rule heralds a fundamental departure from the agency 
conception of lawyering described in Part II. The law of agency does 
not require the agent to exercise ―independent‖ judgment—
professional or otherwise—and it does not require disclosure to the 
principal of information that the agent does not wish to receive.
58
 
Under agency principles, the principal may ―manifest a lack of 
interest in receiving some or all information from the agent‖ and bear 
the risk that her decision will be worse for such lack of interest.
59
 
Rule 2.1, by contrast, requires the attorney to provide information that 
the client is, in the language of the official comment, ―disinclined to 
confront.‖60 
Why does Model Rule 2.1 require the independent judgment of 
counsel and the provision of information to the client over the client‘s 
protestations when agency law requires neither? The reasons for 
requiring independence of counsel are hardly self-evident, especially 
for those who subscribe to the agency view of lawyering described in 
Part II. A client on the agency view hires a lawyer, pays for legal 
service, and presumably has a right to direct the representation as she 
wishes. This tension with agency lies at the core of our inquiry in this 
Part. We will ask why our ethics rules depart from agency law to 
insist on independence and when counsel may no longer serve strictly 
as an agent, and instead must exercise such independence. The 
answers to each of these questions will set the stage for our inquiry in 
Part IV into what lawyer independence requires of counsel.  
B. Why Lawyer Independence? 
What is the purpose of the lawyer-independence requirement set 
forth in Rule 2.1? A review of the limited case law citing this Rule
61
 
suggests that the courts are far from a clear, consistent understanding 
of the Rule or its purpose. The cases that cite Model Rule 2.1 can be 
grouped into four categories. First, a number of cases (often in the 
bankruptcy setting) cite the Rule in support of the notion that an 
attorney has an obligation to provide advice that will enable the client 
                                                                                                                 
58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b (―An agent owes the principal a 
duty to provide information to the principal that the agent knows or has reason to know the 
principal would wish to have.‖). 
59 Id.  
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1. 
61 In total, the lawyer-independence language of Rule 2.1 has been cited in fewer than 
forty reported decisions in the state and federal courts, often as dicta or as additional authority 
rather than as the central theory in the case. For a discussion of why Rule 2.1 has to date been 
largely ignored by courts and disciplinary authorities (and, by extension, lawyers), see infra 
notes 218–21 and accompanying text.  
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to make an informed decision.
62
 The second concerns conflicts of 
interest, often based on the attorney‘s personal interest.63 The third 
arises in attorney-disciplinary matters, disqualification motions, or 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims arising from the attorney‘s 
sexual relationship with the client.
64
 The fourth category, which need 
not divert us here, concerns allegations that the attorney has harmed 
the client through a wrongful action—claims unrelated to Model Rule 
2.1 and rejected accordingly.
65
  
Let us consider the first interpretation–that Rule 2.1 is designed to 
ensure that the client receives the best possible advice with respect to 
her options before making a decision. The proposition alone is hardly 
objectionable; it is, as discussed earlier, a staple of the agency 
relationship.
66
 An agent owes a fiduciary duty to the principal, which 
includes disclosure of information material to the principal.
67
 That 
duty to disclose allows the principal to manage the agency 
                                                                                                                 
62 See, e.g., In re Count Liberty, LLC, 370 B.R. 259, 281–83 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(―The attorney must render candid advice, so the client can make informed decisions regarding 
the representation.‖ (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Engel, 246 B.R. 784, 
792 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that lawyer cannot ―blithely allow a client to casually 
complete or review the official schedules and statements without guidance as to the 
consequences of such action‖); In re Pinkins, 213 B.R. 818, 822–23 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) 
(finding that attorneys who did not meet with their client until after the case was filed did not 
adequately represent the client); In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 550–52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1988) (―[A]n attorney is to facilitate informed decision-making by his client.‖). 
63 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999) (noting that while 
attorney may have personal interest in appealing a discovery sanction, the decision to appeal 
should ―turn entirely on the client‘s interest‖); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728 n.14 (1986) 
(noting that attorney rendered independent professional judgment when he recommended a 
settlement and agreed to waive the statutory fee award and that he did not allow his own 
interests to influence his professional advice); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 
435 (1985) (noting that an attorney who is disqualified for misconduct may have ―a personal 
interest‖ in an appeal, but that the ―decision to appeal should turn entirely on the client‘s 
interest‖); In re Key, 582 S.E.2d 400, 402 (S.C. 2003) (disciplining attorney who represented 
parties on both sides of the transaction).  
64 See. e.g., Horaist v. Doctor‘s Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(denying motion to disqualify counsel due to conflict of interest arising from prior sexual 
relationship with client); In re Ryland, 985 So. 2d 71, 75–76 (La. 2008) (disciplining attorney 
for consensual sexual relations with client); In re DeFrancesch, 877 So. 2d 71, 77 (La. 2004) 
(disciplining attorney for attempt to coerce client into sexual relations); In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 
859, 867 (La. 1998) (reasoning that attorney who engages in sexual relationship with a client 
risks losing ―the objectivity and reasonableness that form the basis of the lawyer‘s independent 
professional judgment‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass‘n v. 
Groshon, 82 P.3d 99, 105–06 (Okla. 2003) (disciplining counsel for inappropriate sexual 
advance to client); In re Halverson, 998 P.2d 833, 841 (Wash. 2000) (finding that attorney 
violated Rule 2.1 by engaging in sexual relationship with client); State v. Stough, 980 P.2d 298, 
301–02 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that defendant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel because of sexual relationship with counsel). 
65 See, e.g., Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 531 S.E.2d 282, 285–86 (S.C. 2000) 
(rejecting cause of action against counsel for breach of express guarantee).  
66 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (stating the general proposition 
of agency law that an agent has a duty to act for the benefit of the principal).  
67 Id. § 8.11. 
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While this rationale for lawyer independence has superficial 
appeal, it does not square with a reading of the other Model Rules. 
The lawyer is already expressly required by other provisions of the 
Model Rules to provide competent representation
69
 and to provide the 
client with all information needed to make an informed decision.
70
 
The care that attended the drafting of the Model Rules makes 
redundancy unlikely.
71
 Therefore, a reading of the Rule as nothing 
more than a restatement of client-protection provisions set forth 
elsewhere in the ethics rules appears invalid.
72
  
The second and third categories described above can be combined 
under one conceptual rubric: a lawyer‘s personal interests must not 
color her advice or representation.
73
 That proposition, standing alone, 
is beyond question, and it too is embraced by agency law.
74
 Again, 
however, the Model Rules expressly regulate such conflicts of interest 
elsewhere, prohibiting representation of clients when the personal 
interests of the attorney would materially limit the attorney‘s effort.75  
Thus, it appears that the independent-professional-judgment and 
candor requirements of Rule 2.1 call for something other than a 
restatement of the agency principles of competence, communication, 
and loyalty described in Part II. These rationales seek to explain 
lawyer independence from a principal-agency standpoint, when in 
fact lawyer independence is a departure from it. If we are to identify 
                                                                                                                 
68 See id. § 8.11 cmt. b (stating that the agent‘s duty to provide information to the 
principal allows the principal to exercise control in the agency relationship).  
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009). 
70 Id. R. 1.4. 
71 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.12 (discussing the multiple drafts and 
widespread circulation, commentary, and revision that preceded ABA approval of the Model 
Rules). See generally Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (providing an account of 
the process that lead to the adoption of the Model Rules).  
72 The comments to Model Rule 2.1 impliedly affirm this reading by noting that a duty to 
inform the client of the adverse consequences ―to the client‖ may arise under Model Rule 1.4, 
which requires communication with the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 
5. 
73 Occasionally, a court will cite Rule 2.1 to support a finding that the attorney‘s personal 
interests (or the interests of other clients) conflict with the interests of the client. E.g., Scheffler 
v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 950 So. 2d 641, 651 (La. 2007) (noting that Rule 2.1 requires an 
attorney‘s ―undivided loyalty‖). As discussed in the text, Rule 2.1 is best understood as 
addressing concerns other than loyalty.  
74 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
75 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (prohibiting representation when 
―there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer‘s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a 
personal interest of the lawyer‖); see also id. R. 1.8 (regulating specific conflicts of interest 
between lawyer and client).  
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the core interest served by Rule 2.1, we need to look beyond client 
interests—the preoccupation of the agency conception of lawyering.  
David Luban offers critical insight here. Rule 2.1, he argues, 
places special importance on the lawyer‘s role in advising the client—
not to protect the client‘s interest in receiving competent advice or 
sufficient information, but to increase the prospect that the client will 
refrain from acting when the proposed behavior is wrongful.
76
 
Suppose, for example, that a client seeks the advice of counsel about 
whether the client‘s proposed action is legal. Model Rule 1.6 affords 
confidentiality to client conversations with counsel
77
 because: 
The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and 
to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to 
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer 
needs this information to represent the client effectively and, 
if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful 
conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers 
in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex 
of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. 
Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients 
follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
78
  
Thus, Model Rules 2.1 and 1.6 must be read in tandem. A central 
rationale for the confidentiality obligation of Model Rule 1.6 is to 
enable lawyers to advise the client on the correct state of the law to 
ensure that the client complies with the law.  
The shield of confidentiality, of course, extracts a considerable 
societal cost. Third parties who may have been the victim of client 
wrongdoing lose an important source of information: the attorney 
who learns incriminating information from the client.
79
 As Luban 
                                                                                                                 
76 LUBAN, supra note 15. Luban argues that ―if the lawyer doesn‘t tell the client that what 
he plans is unlawful, in many instances nobody will.‖ Id. at 154. Luban borrows this argument 
from Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint 
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958), who caution that, in the counselor role, the 
attorney ―must be at pains to preserve a sufficient detachment from his client‘s interests so that 
he remains capable of sound and objective appraisal of the propriety of what his client proposes 
to do.‖ 
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (providing, with exceptions, that ―[a] 
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client‖). The 
confidentiality obligations set forth in the Model Rules should not be confused with the 
attorney-client privilege, typically codified in evidence rules, and applicable when the attorney 
is called to testify. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 (federal privilege rule). 
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2; see also id. pmbl. para. 13 
(―Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.‖). 
79 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers offers an illustration based on 
the famous and troubling Lake Pleasant Bodies Case. See People v. Belge, 50 A.D.2d 1088 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff’d, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976), cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
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notes, Model Rule 2.1 solves a puzzle that has long vexed ethics law: 
how to justify confidentiality given this considerable societal cost. 
Confidentiality ―is a good bet for society only because we can count 
on lawyers to give good advice on compliance (and on clients to take 
that advice). If the lawyer doesn‘t give independent, candid advice, 
this entire argument, and indeed the whole edifice of confidentiality, 
comes tumbling down.‖80 
Model Rule 2.1, therefore, imposes conditions on counseling that 
will enhance its accuracy: the lawyer‘s advice must be grounded on 
independent professional judgment and must be relayed candidly to 
the client.
81
 Without these elements, the advice is less likely to be 
―legal and correct,‖82 the client is less likely to desist from his 




Rule 2.1 does not specify the precise type of harm or ―wrongful 
conduct‖84 that it seeks to prevent through independent professional 
judgment. A narrow construction of the Rule would limit such 
concerns to criminal wrongdoing, a troubling approach since clients 
can perpetrate vast tortious harm on third parties, as the corporate 
scandals of recent decades have made all too clear.
85
 A sweeping 
construction of the terms ―wrongful conduct‖ might include any legal 
wrongdoing, civil or criminal, that could be visited on society or a 
third party through the client‘s wrongdoing. The latter view would 
have an anomalous effect, however, of extending the reach of Model 
                                                                                                                 
 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 reporter‘s note (2000). A client admitted to killing two 
people whose bodies had not yet been discovered. The lawyer was barred under the 
confidentiality rules from disclosing the location of the bodies to the families of the likely 
victims. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. b, illus. 1. 
The Restatement notes that the cost of confidentiality includes ―persons whose personal plight 
and character are much more sympathetic than those of the lawyer‘s client or who could 
accomplish great public good or avoid great public detriment if the information were disclosed.‖ 
Id. § 60 cmt. b. 
80 LUBAN, supra note 15, at 156 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).  
81 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1. 
82 Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (noting that clients, ―[a]lmost without exception,‖ seek lawyers to 
determine their rights, as well as what is ―legal and correct‖).  
83 Inaccurate advice from counsel may also frustrate criminal prosecution or the 
imposition of liability based on intentional or malicious conduct because an attorney‘s advice 
that the conduct is proper may be admissible as evidence with respect to the client‘s mens rea. 
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.  
84 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2.  
85 See, e.g., Mark Sherman, High Court Will Review Skilling Case: Appeal of Former 
Enron Leader Imprisoned Ex-CEO Serving 24-Year Term, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at 
A10, available at 2009 WLNR 26370000 (―[A]ccounting tricks and shady business deals . . . led 
to the loss of thousands of jobs, more than $60 billion in Enron stock value and more than $2 
billion in employee pension plans after the company imploded in 2001.‖) For an analysis of the 
role of counsel in various Enron transactions, see generally Cramton, supra note 2. 
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Rule 2.1 beyond the ―criminal or fraudulent‖ client activities that 
counsel is prohibited from knowingly assisting under Model Rule 
1.2(d).
86
 Thus, we will confine our understanding of the ―wrongful 
conduct‖ that Model Rule 2.1 seeks to prevent to ―criminal or 
fraudulent,‖ with the further limitation that ―fraudulent‖ conduct have 
a ―purpose to deceive.‖87 
By demanding lawyer independence to protect the interests of 
those other than the client, Rule 2.1 presents a stark departure from 
the agency conception of lawyering. As a result, it is critical that we 
understand when it applies. We turn to that question next.   
C. When Must the Lawyer Be Independent? 
Rule 2.1 is certainly not modest in its demands or reach, if its 
literal terms are controlling: in representing the client, the lawyer 
must ―exercise independent professional judgment‖ and provide 
―candid advice.‖88 Whatever ―independent professional judgment‖ 
requires of counsel,
89
 it is clear that the demand poses a direct 
challenge to the agency conception of the attorney-client 
relationship.
90
 Thus, a critical threshold question is when must the 
lawyer act with such independence.  
1. Eliminating Advocacy 
By its terms, Model Rule 2.1 must be satisfied ―in representing a 
client.‖91 Thus, on a literal reading, it would appear that counsel must 
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice 
to the client in all phases of the attorney-client relationship—an 
interpretation that threatens to overturn entirely the agency view of 
lawyering. (We will term this interpretation the expansive view.) On 
the other hand, the title of Rule 2.1, ―Advisor,‖92 suggests that the 
Rule applies less expansively, i.e., when the attorney is advising or 
counseling the client (the advisory view)—a view that poses 
challenging interpretive questions of its own.  
The evolution of Rule 2.1 suggests that the demand of independent 
professional judgment does not extend to the lawyer‘s role as an 
advocate.
93
 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (―Model 
                                                                                                                 
86 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d). 
87 Id. R. 1.0(d) (defining ―fraud‖ or ―fraudulent‖ to require ―a purpose to deceive‖).  
88 Id. R. 2.1.  
89 See infra Part IV. 
90 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.  
91 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1. 
92 Id. 
93 The candor requirement of Model Rule 2.1 would not attach to court-directed 
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Code‖), which predated the Model Rules,94 declared that the 
attorney‘s roles of ―advocate or advisor‖ are ―essentially different,‖ 
and that the advocate should resolve doubts about the law in favor of 
the client.
95
 ―[I]n appropriate circumstances,‖ the advisor, by contrast, 
―should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate 
decisions of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law.‖96 
The Model Code‘s comments elaborated on the disjunction between 
the advocate and advisor roles, noting that ―partisan advocacy‖ 




Moreover, the reasons for allowing attorneys wide expanse in their 
presentation of arguments apply only in the advocacy setting; they 
have no force in the advice or counseling role.
98
 The adversary system 
allows opposing counsel to counter faulty arguments and expose their 
deficiencies, reducing the risk that an erroneous argument will carry 
the day.
99
 Moreover, the disposition of the case lies with the judge or 
jury, who render their own independent judgment to distinguish the 
faulty from the valid.
100
 Thus, counsel‘s faulty argument is just that—
an argument, not a call for action as it might be in the counseling role. 
In addition, as Daniel Markovits has argued, political principles 
support the unbridled role of the advocate: if the parties to a contested 
matter are to accord legitimacy to the verdict, which binds them and 
may deprive them of liberty and property, it is critical that their 
attorney‘s voice be unconstrained in presenting nonfrivolous 
                                                                                                                 
 
communications because the Rule clearly limits candor to the client advisory role. See id. The 
attorney‘s obligation of candor to the tribunal is set forth Model Rule 3.3. See id. R. 3.3. 
94 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the American Bar 
Association in 1969, effective in 1970. Nearly every American jurisdiction adopted the Model 
Code within a few years. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.11. The Model Code was 
superseded by the Model Rules in the 1980s. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
95 MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980). 
96 Id.  
97 Id. EC 7-3 n.9. 
98 See Fuller & Randall, supra note 76, at 1161 (―The reasons that justify and even require 
partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant any license to the lawyer to participate as 
legal advisor in a line of conduct that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality.‖). For a 
summary and a powerful critique of the reasons advocates are afforded license in the advocacy 
setting, see LUBAN, supra note 15, at 62–64; see also id. at 153–54 (offering a summary account 
of the distinction between attorney advocacy and advisory roles). William Simon has likewise 
identified an array of lawyer excesses in the adversary system and questioned whether they are 
required to further the objectives of justice. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: 
A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS (1998).  
99 See LUBAN, supra note 15, at 154 (―Adversarial ideology maintains that judges can do 
their interpretive job properly only if they hear the most forceful arguments on all sides, in an 
unvarnished form.‖) 
100 See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 
1182 (2005) (discussing the importance of a fully informed tribunal in an adversarial setting). 
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arguments that precede the verdict.
101
 Thus, while the attorney must 
not lie about a matter of fact or law in communications to courts and 
third parties,
102
 and may not proffer frivolous arguments to the 
court,
103
 she need not independently assess and agree with each 




Thus, we can dismiss the expansive interpretation of Rule 2.1: the 
Rule does not apply to the attorney‘s advocacy role, notwithstanding 
the Rule‘s purported application when the attorney is ―representing 
the client.‖105 A contrary interpretation is inconsistent with the title of 
the Rule, the distinction between advocacy and counseling first 
offered by the Model Code, and the special reasons for affording 
counsel wide berth in the advocacy role.
106
 
While lawyers certainly distinguish the advocacy and counseling 
role in practice, they may be less sensitive to their critical ethical 
differences. The legal profession, of course, understands that much of 
its work is outside the courtroom because counseling and furthering 
client transactions are central functions of the profession. 
Nonetheless, the transactional lawyer still harbors much of the 
advocacy ethos of her courtroom colleagues,
107
 a perception that can 
                                                                                                                 
101 DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 171–211 (2008).  
102 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009) (prohibiting knowingly making 
misstatements of fact or law to the court); id. R. 4.1 (prohibiting knowingly making false 
statement of fact or law to third parties). 
103 Id. R. 3.1 (providing a lawyer must ground all issues and defenses in proceedings in 
nonfrivolous law and fact). 
104 MARKOVITS, supra note 101, at 53 (stating that advocates have ―enormous leeway to 
promote accounts of the law that they privately reject‖). Markovits further states, ―[A]n 
argument ‗. . . is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client‘s position 
ultimately will not prevail.‘‖ Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2). 
For an early statement of this view, see GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS 84 (5th ed. 1884). ―The lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his 
judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury.‖ Id., 
quoted in LUBAN, supra note 15, at 20.  
105 This is not to suggest that lawyer independence is beyond discussion in the advocacy 
setting. See generally SIMON, supra note 98 (arguing that the advocate is subject to 
independence constraints). The claim here is narrower, that the sweep of Model Rule 2.1 does 
not extend to advocacy. 
106 While the distinction between the advocacy and advisory roles is crucial to 
understanding the sweep of Rule 2.1, we must apply the distinction carefully. In the course of a 
litigated matter, the lawyer frequently communicates with the client about the client‘s prospects 
in the case. The attorney, though engaged in a litigation matter for the client, is not acting as an 
advocate in his client communications. Rule 2.1, therefore, requires the lawyer to advise the 
client about advocacy matters with independent professional judgment and candor.  
107 See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 100, at 1182 (―Ask a securities lawyer why she opposes a 
requirement to report out evidence of client fraud, and she is likely to mention the principle of 
zealous representation, seemingly unaware that this phrase, as originally stated in the Model 
Code, applied only to representation in litigation.‖). 
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be explained in part by the failure of ethics codes to honor this 
distinction until 1970.
108
 If we understand all of lawyering through the 
prism of advocacy, however, then the demands of independent 
professional judgment will be marginalized. It is therefore critical to 
be clear that: (1) advocacy and counseling are ethically distinct; and 
(2) lawyer independence—whatever it entails—controls the critical 
domain beyond advocacy, where attorneys counsel their clients.  
2. Nonadvocacy Assistance 
If we can safely eliminate advocacy from the sweep of Rule 2.1, 
our next question is whether independent professional judgment is 
required in all or only certain attorney efforts outside the advocacy 
role. As the ABA‘s official comments to the Model Rules make clear, 
Rule 2.1 applies when the attorney provides advice to the client.
109
 
The more challenging question is whether the Rule is implicated only 
when the attorney provides advice to the client, or whether it also 
applies when the attorney assists the client to effect a transaction or 
other objective outside the litigation role (which we will term 
nonadvocacy assistance). The ABA‘s reference to advice could be 
construed to suggest that the drafters contemplated a narrow, advice-
only application of the Rule. On the other hand, the comments may 
imply only that advice is the archetypal, but not the sole setting in 
which the issue of independence arises outside the advocacy setting. 
In addition, the second sentence of Rule 2.1 limits its application to 
the advice instances only, suggesting that the ―representation‖ 
language of the first sentence has reach beyond the advice role.
110
  
Moreover, if the framers of the Rule were intent on limiting its 
nonadvocacy reach only to instances of advice, why require the 
―exercise [of] independent professional judgment‖ in ―representing 
[the] client‖?111 Why not require instead independent judgment ―in 
advising the client‖?112 One possible answer is that advice and 
                                                                                                                 
108 MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 n.9 (1980) (effective in 1970) 
(―Today‘s lawyers perform two distinct types of functions, and our ethical standards should, but 
in the main do not, recognize these two functions. Judge Philbrick McCoy recently reported to 
the American Bar Association the need for a reappraisal of the Canons in light of the new and 
distinct function of counselor, as distinguished from advocate, which today predominates in the 
legal profession.‖ (quoting E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. 
REV. 575, 578 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
109 Model Rules OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1.  
110 Model Rule 2.1 provides in its entirety: ―In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and 
political factors, that may be relevant to the client‘s situation.‖ Id. R. 2.1 (emphasis added).  
111 Id. 
112 In fact, sentence two of the Rule does precisely that. See supra note 110 and 
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independent professional judgment are, as a practical matter, 
inextricably linked: independent professional judgment, one might 
contend, can have no practical effect on a representation outside the 
advocacy setting unless it affects the advice provided to the client. 
However, there are critical instances outside the advocacy setting 
when counsel engages in activities other than advising the client and 
independent professional judgment will affect her actions. For 
example, when an attorney structures or effects a transaction on 
behalf of a client, the behavior of an attorney guided by independent 
professional judgment may differ profoundly from that of an attorney 
guided only by client interest.
113
  
Moreover, an attorney‘s actions to effect the nonadvocacy ends of 
his or her clients may well be tantamount to advice, in that the 
attorney‘s actions imply as much about the merits of the transaction to 
the client as an express statement. If nonadvocacy assistance is 
tantamount to advice, then even under a narrow advice-only view of 
Model Rule 2.1, attorneys must exercise independent professional 
judgment in providing such assistance. And even if we choose not to 
construe assistance as the equivalent of advice, it is curious to require 
independent judgment of counsel in one instance and not the other, 
especially given that counsel‘s advice and actions are affected by its 
exercise.  
The evolution of the Model Rule 2.1 offers an additional reason to 
conclude that the Rule requires independent professional judgment 
not only when providing advice, but in the nonadvocacy-assistance 
role generally. The predecessor provision to Model Rule 2.1, 
contained in the Model Code, is the first ethical rule to suggest that 
attorneys have distinct obligations in the advisory setting.
114
 Ethical 
Canon 7-3 provides:  
A lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and 
adviser, but the two roles are essentially different. In asserting 
a position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most 
part deals with past conduct and must take the facts as he 
finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser primarily 
assists his client in determining the course of future conduct 
and relationships. . . . In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer 
in appropriate circumstances should give his professional 
                                                                                                                 
 
accompanying text.  
113 For an extended discussion of the transaction setting and the role of lawyer 
independence, see infra Part IV.C.  
114 MODEL Code OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980).  
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opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts would 
likely be as to the applicable law.
115
 
If the Canon intended to divide lawyering into two categories, 
advocate and advisor, then the latter category presumably included all 
nonadvocacy efforts of counsel. Moreover, by characterizing the 
advisor role as assisting the client in determining ―future conduct and 
relationships,‖116 the Canon implied that attorney actions that 
determine such future relationships—i.e., the attorney-transaction 
role—should be subject to the demands of lawyer independence as 
well.  
The purpose of lawyer independence discussed earlier
117
 also 
suggests that Rule 2.1 should apply in the transaction setting as well. 
Recall that Rule 2.1 is intended to protect society and third parties 
from client wrongdoing by ensuring that attorney advice is 
independent and professional. When the lawyer carries out a 
transaction on behalf of a client without exercising independent 
professional judgment, the risks are comparable to a client who does 
not receive the benefit of the lawyer‘s independent professional 
judgment about whether a transaction is wrongful. In the latter case, 
we are concerned that the client will be insufficiently informed that 
her proposed action is wrongful, thereby increasing the prospects that 
she will behave wrongfully. In the former, we are concerned that the 
lawyer will serve the client‘s objective without assessing its propriety, 
again increasing the risk of wrongful behavior. It would be curious, at 
best, to require counsel to exercise independent professional judgment 
so that the client’s actions are informed, but allow the attorney to act 
on behalf of the client unrestrained by such judgment. In each case, 
the absence of independent professional judgment poses a substantial 
risk to society and to third parties.  
Thus, the language, history, and purpose of Rule 2.1 support the 
nonadvocacy-assistance interpretation of the Rule. The Rule applies 
when the attorney provides advice or assists the client in furthering a 
transaction or other nonadvocacy objective. Our next question is how 
this understanding of the Rule and its application relates to the agency 
view of lawyering described in Part II. 
                                                                                                                 
115 Id. (footnote omitted). 
116 Id. 
117 See supra Part III.B.  
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D. Agency and Independence Reconciled  
Our understanding of the rationale underlying Rule 2.1 allows us 
to explore another threshold question: how lawyer independence can 
be reconciled with the client-autonomy or agency principles described 
in Part II. As we shall see in Part IV, when Rule 2.1 applies, it often 
requires counsel to undertake special efforts, including the attorney‘s 
inquiry into the factual circumstances and research regarding the legal 
standards implicated by the facts.
118
 The client, however, effectively 
has the right under Rule 1.2(a) to establish reasonable limits on the 
nature and extent of the services performed by counsel.
119
 Thus, if the 
client does not wish counsel to examine a particular issue, the client 
and attorney can agree to such limitations, which are generally 
enforced by the courts.
120
 In this Section, we will examine the 
relationship between lawyer independence and client autonomy 
embodied by these two provisions of the Model Rules. 
When the client expressly or impliedly requests the advice of 
counsel on the propriety of a transaction, the client presumably will 
not object to the efforts of counsel to develop information sufficient 
to answer the question properly.
121
 When the attorney raises questions 
about the propriety of a client‘s proposed transaction, however, the 
client may not wish counsel to undertake efforts to examine the 
issue—for reasons of expense or because he plans to consummate the 
transaction regardless of its propriety. If the attorney has not been 
asked to further the transaction, the client can direct counsel not to 
examine the issue.
122
 The more challenging questions arise when the 
                                                                                                                 
118 See infra Part IV.B.2.  
119 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) (―Subject to paragraphs (c) and 
(d), a lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation . . . .‖); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19 
(2000) (discussing the requirements a lawyer must fulfill before a lawyer may limit 
representation). Although Model Rule 1.2 appears to vest in counsel the right to limit the scope 
of the representation, it is in fact indifferent to whether the client or the attorney proposes the 
limitation, provided that both attorney and client agree. In practice, the client has considerable 
authority under this provision, since the client can terminate the representation if the attorney is 
unwilling to agree to the client‘s proposed limitation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 
R. 1.16(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from matter when discharged by client).  
120 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 258–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(upholding attorney-client agreement that attorney would administer estate but would not 
provide tax planning).  
121 Moreover, the client cannot waive competent representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (noting that although client and lawyer have substantial latitude to limit 
representation, ―an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the 
duty to provide competent representation‖); see also Cramton, supra note 2, at 146 n.12 
(concluding that a client may not waive lawyer competence). 
122 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (noting that generally there is no 
requirement to provide advice when not requested by client).  
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attorney is working on the transaction about which the attorney 
identifies a question or concern. If the client asks the lawyer not to 
examine the issue under Model Rule 1.2(c), must the lawyer exercise 
independence under Model Rule 2.1? Two examples will allow us to 
clarify the issue. 
First, suppose that an attorney working on the client‘s transaction 
raises the question of whether the tax-allocation scheme specified in 
the transaction documents is the most favorable for the client. The 
attorney tells the client that, while she is concerned about the 
question, she cannot answer it without conducting legal research and 
analysis. The client responds that he wishes to minimize cost and 
directs counsel not to examine the issue. In effect, the client seeks to 
limit the scope of the representation under Model Rule 1.2(c). The 
question then becomes whether counsel is obligated under the lawyer 
independence requirements of Model Rule 2.1 to reject such 
limitation.  
While the tax allocation and countless other planning questions 
and opportunities of a similar kind arise in the transaction context, 
they do not—standing alone—trigger the demands of independent 
professional judgment under Model Rule 2.1. Their distinguishing 
characteristic is that they are concerned with protection of the client‘s 
interests, which—as noted earlier—is not the objective of 
independent professional judgment.
123
 Protection of client interests is, 
of course, central to the lawyering role, but the attorney‘s 
responsibilities in this regard are captured by the competency 
provision of the attorney ethics rules
124
 and by the attorney‘s duty of 
care to the client.
125
 The duties under both competency and the duty 
of care are owed to the client.
126
 A failure to satisfy either obligation 
harms the client and not a third party or a societal interest in avoiding 
crime or fraud. The interest at issue belongs to the client, and within 
the bounds of competency, it is the client‘s interest to waive. In the 
tax-planning example, therefore, the client could, pursuant to Rule 
1.2(c), agree with the attorney to a limitation on the scope of the 
representation under which the latter will not research the tax 
                                                                                                                 
123 See supra notes 69–82 and accompanying text. 
124 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1.  
125 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
126 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (―A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.‖); MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 30, § 19.3 (describing the duty of 
competence owed to a client as part of the standard of care in a malpractice claim). Although 
attorneys can owe duties of care to nonclients in some jurisdictions and circumstances, in this 
example the duty to protect client interests is owed strictly to the client. For a discussion of 
when courts might extend attorney duties of care to third parties, see infra notes 231–50 and 
accompanying text.  
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question or devise a means by which to reduce the tax burden posed 
by the transaction.
127
 The attorney could honor such limitation and 
consummate the transaction without violating Model Rule 2.1. 
Now suppose instead that the attorney raises the question of 
whether the tax-allocation scheme constitutes a criminal tax evasion. 
Again, the attorney states that she will need to conduct legal research 
and analysis to answer the question, and again suppose that the client 
directs her not to do so, either for reasons of cost or because the client 
wishes to effect the transaction regardless of its legality. Here, the 
question is not what will serve the client best, but whether the 
transaction is wrongful. As discussed earlier, Rule 2.1 is designed to 
further the societal and third-party interests in reducing wrongful 
behavior, not to advance a client interest.
128
 Societal and third-party 
interests are not the client‘s to waive. Therefore, when the issue 
expressly or impliedly implicates wrongful behavior, the client‘s 
voice in controlling the scope of the representation under Rule 1.2(c) 
gives way to the demands of lawyer independence under Rule 2.1. 
The very nature of ―independent‖ judgment suggests that it is not 
subject to the direction (or caprice) of the client, including the client‘s 
insistence that it not be exercised.
129
  
Rule 2.1 is implicated when, in the course of (1) providing advice 
to the client; or (2) effecting nonadvocacy ends for the client, 
including attorney efforts to structure and effect client transactions, an 
attorney has (3) reason to suspect that the client‘s proposed conduct is 
criminal or fraudulent. With respect to the third element, the test is an 
objective one: when the facts and circumstances present reasonable 
grounds for concern or suspicion that the behavior in question might 
be wrongful, the attorney‘s obligations under Rule 2.1 attach.130 In 
such cases, the lawyer must employ her independent professional 
judgment to assess the propriety of the proposed client conduct and 
report her conclusions candidly to the client. When the lawyer is 
required to exercise independent professional judgment under Rule 
2.1, the client cannot waive compliance with the Rule, although he 
                                                                                                                 
127 Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 258–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(upholding attorney-client agreement that attorney would administer estate but would not 
provide tax planning).  
128 Because our definition of wrongful conduct includes criminal or intentionally 
fraudulent behavior, our example could instead have concerned the attorney‘s suspicion that the 
transaction would defraud a third party. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. For a 
discussion of the lawyer‘s transaction role when questions of client fraud arise, see infra Part 
IV.C. 
129 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (noting that advice required under 
the Rule may include information that the client is ―disinclined to confront‖).  
130 For examples of situations in which counsel should have reason for suspicion of client 
wrongdoing, see supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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retains the right to terminate the representation.
131
 In each instance, if 
the client refuses to allow counsel to undertake the actions necessary 
to satisfy Rule 2.1, then counsel must withdraw from the matter.
132
  
Lawyer independence, therefore, does not abolish the client-
autonomy or agency notions that form the bedrock of modern legal 
practice. On the contrary, our interpretation preserves the basic 
notions of principal control and identifies those narrowly 
circumscribed instances when client autonomy must give way to a 
larger interest—protection of society and third parties from criminal 
or fraudulent conduct. Exactly what Rule 2.1 requires of counsel in 
such instances is the subject of our next inquiry. 
IV. WHAT DOES INDEPENDENCE REQUIRE? 
A. Introduction  
Armed with an understanding of why and when Model Rule 2.1 
departs from the agency vision of lawyering, we can now turn to our 
central question: what does the Rule require of lawyers? Building on 
our earlier findings that the Rule applies when the attorney advises 
the client and when she provides nonadvocacy assistance to the client, 
we will explore the implications of Rule 2.1 for counsel in advising 
and effecting transactions for clients.  
B. Advice  
Suppose that the client asks the attorney either expressly or by 
implication, for advice about the legal propriety of the client‘s 
proposed action. As discussed earlier, if the client‘s proposed action 
is criminal or fraudulent, and the attorney advises the client of this 
fact, the client typically will not undertake the action.
133
 The accuracy 
of the lawyer‘s advice is the sine qua non of this protective enterprise: 
the lawyer must accurately assess the propriety of the transaction if 
the client is to be diverted from his wrongful design.
134
  
This commitment to accuracy in counseling is a sharp departure 
from the truth-finding theory of the adversary system. It is conducted 
                                                                                                                 
131 Although the lawyer may charge for her services in conducting such inquiry, a client 
who opposes the inquiry for expense or any other reason may choose to terminate the 
representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3) (requiring counsel to 
withdraw from a matter when discharged by the client).  
132 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring counsel to withdraw 
from a matter when continued service will result in violation of the Model Rules).  
133 That, at least, is the supposition of the Model Rules. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (―[L]awyers 
know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.‖). 
134 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (noting also that accurate advice is 
necessary if we are to justify the societal costs of affording confidentiality to the consultation).  
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outside the adversary setting, and thus cannot take refuge in the 
theory that truth will emerge from the clash of viewpoints.
135
 To 
enhance accuracy, Model Rule 2.1 imposes conditions on the 
counseling role: ―In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖136 Rule 
2.1, in other words, is committed to its own theory of truth finding: 
accuracy will be enhanced if its conditions are satisfied. While the 
elements of Rule 2.1 are inextricably linked, for discussion purposes 
we will parse the Rule into three demands—independence, 
professional judgment, and candor—and consider each in turn.  
1. Independence 
As we have discussed, in requiring independence, Rule 2.1 is not 
concerned with the lawyer‘s potential conflicts of interest with other 
client matters or the lawyer‘s personal interests.137 These concerns are 
expressly addressed by other ethics rules.
138
 As the drafters‘ 
comments note, the Rule calls for the lawyer‘s ―straightforward 
advice‖ and ―honest assessment,‖ even when the advice involves 
―unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to 
confront.‖139 The danger then is servility—the lawyer‘s unwillingness 
to tell the client what he does not want to hear. In their brief 
discussion of the Rule, Hazard and Hodes note that a client may want 
to have his ―preconceptions confirmed‖ and that the lawyer who 
wishes to maintain employment ―may be tempted to play sycophant 
to such client.‖140 Rule 2.1, therefore, insists on attorney 
independence from the client: if it is to be accurate, an assessment of 
the legal propriety of the proposed activity must not be unduly 
influenced by the client‘s desire for a favorable answer. 
A variety of factors—ranging from economic, to psychological, to 
internalized perceptions of the lawyer‘s role—can conspire to 
undermine the attorney‘s exercise of independent judgment. The 
attorney is, of course, interested in establishing or maintaining a 
strong client relationship. For clients committed to lawful and ethical 
                                                                                                                 
135 See, e.g., Scontsas v. Citizens Ins. Co. of N.J., 253 A.2d 831, 833 (N.H. 1969) (―It is the 
philosophy of the adversary system that the truth will more likely be reached if both sides of the 
issue are fully presented . . . .‖). For sources critiquing the adversary theory of truth finding, see 
supra note 98. 
136 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1.  
137 See id. R 1.7(a)(2) (prohibiting representation due to conflicts of interest); see also id. 
R. 1.8 (regulating specific conflicts of interest). 
138 E.g., id. R. 1.7; id. R. 1.8. 
139 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1.  
140 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 23.2, at 23–3. 
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behavior,
141
 the attorney‘s accurate declaration that the transaction is 
improper will pose no threat to the relationship, and should in most 
instances enhance it.
142
 With clients less concerned about propriety 
than profit, however, the attorney may perceive that a negative 
answer will weaken or threaten the relationship.
143
 Some clients may 
even press for a favorable opinion from counsel before acting in the 
hope that it will lessen the legal sanctions if the behavior is later 
challenged.
144
 With these clients, the attorney may feel economic 
pressure to tell the client what she wants to hear.
145
 Even when 
professionals try to rise above such economic concerns, bias can work 
below the level of cognition.
146
  
The attorney may also be subject to a more subtle strain. The 
attorney wants to help the client reach his objective; after all, she was 
hired to assist the client in some way. Loyalty and client trust in the 
                                                                                                                 
141 See ETHICS RES. CTR., 2009 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: ETHICS IN THE 
RECESSION 38 (2009), available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/nbes-final.pdf (reporting 
that eighty-nine percent of employees surveyed said that ―top management talks about the 
importance of workplace ethics and ‗doing the right thing‘‖).  
142 For example, the former General Counsel of General Electric has urged lawyers to 
―think about the ethical, reputational, and enlightened self-interest of their client.‖ Ben W. 
Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 599–600 (2006) (emphasis 
omitted). 
143 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of 
Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 38–39 (2003) (―[A] 
corporation‘s lawyer has a personal, financial interest in currying favor with senior managers by 
facilitating any corporate transaction that enhances their wealth, even if the transaction is not 
wealth enhancing for corporate shareholders.‖); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1220 (2005) (noting that a corporation‘s lawyers do not want to be 
perceived as ―obstructionists who tell the client what it cannot do‖).  
144 The advice of counsel may be admissible when the client‘s mens rea, such as malice or 
intentionality, is at issue. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 29(1) (2000); see also SIMON, supra note 7, at 1557 (noting instances in which attorneys‘ ―bad 
advice made life easier for the clients because, regardless of its merit, it conferred on them a 
significant measure of immunity from liability or public criticism‖). 
145 See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as 
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1006 (2005) (―[I]nside counsel feels unremitting 
pressure to justify herself and her department as a corporate cost center. . . . The best way to do 
so is to facilitate, not interfere with, corporate transactions favored by management.‖); TASK 
FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS‘N, REPORT 14–15 (2003), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf (―The competition to 
acquire and keep client business, or the desire to advance within the corporate executive 
structure, may induce lawyers to seek to please the corporate officials with whom they deal 
rather than to focus on the long-term interest of their client, the corporation.‖). In his seminal 
work, sociologist Robert Nelson found a lack of autonomy in large-firm practice in part because 
power within the firm is reposed in partners with the strongest client associations, who 
internalize client perceptions. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 227–228 (1988). 
146 See Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: 
Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10, 16 (2006) (―Evidence 
on unconscious bias suggests that people are not very good at disregarding their own self-
interest and evaluating information impartially, even when they try to do so.‖). 
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attorney are bedrocks of the relationship.
147
 These are the virtues, 
however, of the agency vision of lawyering described in Part II, 
which, as noted, captures only a portion of the lawyer‘s ethical 
commitment.
148
 The goal of independent professional judgment is not 
to serve the client‘s interest, but to provide an objective analysis of 
whether a proposed action is wrongful and, therefore, a risk to society 
and third parties.
149
 This presents no minor intellectual or emotional 
challenge for an attorney who sees himself as the facilitator of the 
client‘s objectives.150 The attorney who understands herself 
principally as the agent of the client‘s objectives can easily transmute 
this understanding into a desire to find a way to say yes to the client‘s 
inquiry into whether she can proceed as planned.
151
 Rule 2.1 requires 
that counsel resist the gravitational pull of the client in analyzing the 
propriety of proposed conduct.  
The independence required by Rule 2.1 should be distinguished 
from another form of lawyer independence, what might be termed 
client-protection independence. Lawyers serve the client well by 
challenging the client (or, in the corporate setting, management) who 
ignores or underestimates the civil and criminal perils of 
wrongdoing.
152
 In addition to simple greed, profit pressures, group 
think, rationalization, the difficulty in visualizing the victim, and 
scores of other cognitive distortions can confound management‘s 
assessment of the propriety or risk posed by their behavior.
153
 Thus, 
for many attorneys, the skills of argument are not deployed solely to 
persuade courts and third parties of the client‘s cause; they are also 
                                                                                                                 
147 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009) (stating that trust is the 
―hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship‖).  
148 See supra Part III.D.  
149 See supra Part III.B.  
150 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2009) (analyzing the ―cognitive biases arising from partisan kinship between lawyer 
and client‖). Two decades earlier, Robert Nelson found strong client identification that made it 
unlikely that large-firm lawyers ―will act as an independent voice that checks the self-interest of 
clients.‖ NELSON, supra note 145, at 5–6.  
151 Robertson, supra note 150, at 30 (―[A]ttorneys with role identities closely aligned to the 
client‘s goals may be subject to the same cognitive distortions suffered by the client, him or 
herself. Thus, clients may face a conundrum in which the most dedicated attorneys are the worst 
positioned to offer independent counsel.‖). For a discussion of how close association with 
management can affect the judgment of inside counsel, see Kim, supra note 145, at 1004. Kim 
describes inside counsel‘s relationship with its management as a ―psychological contract.‖ Id. 
For a discussion of how cognitive distortions can affect lawyering, see generally David Luban, 
Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279 (2003).  
152 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 17.7 (noting that counsel may have to exercise 
independent professional judgment to determine what is in the corporation‘s best interest).  
153 For an excellent discussion of how these and other ―traps‖ can distort the reasoning of 
businesspersons, see generally ROBERT HOYK & PAUL HERSEY, THE ETHICAL EXECUTIVE: 
BECOMING AWARE OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR: 45 TRAPS THAT EVERY 
ONE OF US FALLS PREY TO (2008).  
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At some point, however, the client may demur and insist that the 
attorney further the transaction despite the lawyer‘s concerns, perhaps 
because the client is unmoved by the attorney‘s arguments about the 
client‘s self interest.155 When the attorney knows that the proposed 
conduct is wrongful, she has no choice but to refuse a directive to 
further the client‘s transaction.156 When the attorney does not have 
knowledge but has reason for concern about the propriety of the 
transaction, however, she may mistakenly conclude that she can 
proceed without further inquiry if the client insists. After all—the 
attorney might reason—if her gadfly efforts are designed to protect 
the client, then the client should have the right, at some point, to 
refuse such protection. The premise, however, is incorrect: the 
independence required by Rule 2.1 is designed to protect society and 
third parties rather than the client, and, therefore, the client does not 
control its exercise




2. Professional Judgment 
It is not enough that counsel differentiate from the client‘s goals 
and independently assess the client‘s proposed action. If Rule 2.1 
demanded only independence, then the lawyer could provide her own 
subjective ―take‖ on the issue. In fact, however, the Rule seeks to 
ensure that the client receives an accurate assessment of the propriety 
of the proposed action, so that the client will refrain from the act if the 
lawyer advises that it is wrongful.
159
 Rule 2.1, therefore, couples 
independence with a demand of professional judgment, imposing an 
                                                                                                                 
154 See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and 
Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 30 (2006) 
(discussing attorney efforts to persuade the client to do the right thing).  
155 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of 
Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 39 (1999) (noting that ―there will be cases in 
which promoting [the client‘s] enlightened self-interest will be at odds with achieving justice.‖) 
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (providing that a lawyer may not 
assist or counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct).  
157 See supra Part III.D.  
158 See infra Part IV.C.  
159 See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. Brad Wendel argues that professional 
judgment serves a caretaker role. Law establishes normative positions on contested matters, and 
thereby allows for the ―coordinated activity‖ of a society. Only a professional, rather than a 
partial, interpretation of the law will enable the law to accomplish its goals. Wendel, supra note 
100, at 1184. Wendel has recently developed these and other arguments into a book-length 
account. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010) [hereinafter, Wendel, 
FIDELITY TO LAW]. See also Gordon, supra note 2, at 20–21 (arguing that lawyers who look for 
loopholes in the law undermine its purpose).  
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additional, critical restraint on the advice provided by counsel.
160
 
Professional judgment consists of a procedural and substantive 
component, as we shall describe below.  
Rule 2.1 demands the independent professional judgment of 
counsel in order to increase the prospects that the attorney‘s advice 
will be accurate.
161
 Uninformed advice is unlikely to be accurate. 
Thus, when the attorney provides advice, it must be grounded on 
sufficient information if it is to be ―professional,‖ as required by 
Model Rule 2.1. This is the procedural condition of professional 
judgment.
162
 When the attorney advises a client that a client‘s 
proposed act is lawful, that advice must be grounded on sufficient 
inquiry into the specifics of the client‘s proposed transaction, together 
with all other facts rendered relevant by the applicable law, as well as 
sufficient review of the law itself.
163
 As a result, in some instances, 
the attorney who is asked to advise the client on the propriety of the 
proposed action may be required to learn considerably more about the 
transaction than the client has originally disclosed.
164
 If the client 
refuses to provide such information then, under our proposed 
construction of Rule 2.1, the attorney will be barred from providing 
the advice.  
The substantive element of professional judgment concerns the 
attorney‘s interpretation of the facts that she has learned and her 
analysis of the legal significance of those facts. With respect to the 
former, the goal is to develop an accurate account of the facts that 
will ground the legal analysis.
165
 With respect to the legal analysis, 
                                                                                                                 
160 For a discussion of the relationship between professional judgment and the accuracy of 
an attorney‘s analysis in a related context, see Kevin H. Michels, Internal Corporate 
Investigations and the Truth, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 83, 104 (2010). 
161 See supra notes 81–93 and accompanying text. 
162 In other settings, courts have questioned the value of a decision that is not informed. 
For example, a patient‘s medical consent is not valid unless it is ―informed,‖ which generally 
requires sufficient understanding of the facts on which the decision is to be based. E.g., Cobbs v. 
Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972) (―[The patient‘s right of self decision] can be effectively 
exercised only if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice.‖). 
The Model Rules will not accept a client decision to waive a conflict of interest without 
―informed‖ consent, which requires a communication of ―adequate information‖ prior to such 
decision. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2009) (requiring ―informed 
consent‖); id. 1.0(e) (defining ―informed consent‖).  
163 With respect to the latter, one can draw an analogy to the competency standard of 
Model Rule 1.1, which would be breached by the lawyer‘s ―failure to ascertain readily 
accessible precedents.‖ HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 3–5.  
164 When the client seems less than forthcoming or her answers less than credible, the 
attorney may need to inquire more deeply. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. If such 
inquiry proves impracticable, then the attorney must withdraw from the matter because she is 
unable to satisfy Rule 2.1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring 
withdrawal if representation will violate the Model Rules). 
165 Here, as elsewhere, the ―independence‖ and ―professional judgment‖ elements of Rule 
2.1 overlap. In developing an accurate account, the lawyer must not only exercise professional 
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the goal—again—is accuracy. In some instances, the law will be 
patently clear on the issue implicated by the facts, and the propriety of 
the client‘s proposed conduct will be obvious to the lawyer.166 At 
other times, assessment of the client‘s proposed conduct will require 
interpretation of laws or court decisions that are less than clear, either 
in their language or in their application to the client‘s factual 
particulars.
167
 This interpretive element is not license for the attorney 
to offer her own idiosyncratic take on the propriety of the client‘s 
conduct. Rule 2.1 calls for the lawyer‘s professionally grounded, 
objective assessment of the propriety of the proposed conduct. 
In exercising independent professional judgment, the lawyer‘s role 
is analogous to that of the judge whose ―choice is constrained by a set 
of rules (or norms, standards, principles, guides, etc.) that are 
authorized by the professional community of which the judge is 
part.‖168 Thus, the lawyer must employ accepted professional 
standards of legal interpretation and reasoning to interpret the law and 
apply it to the client‘s facts to form the conclusions that will ground 
her legal advice. Professional judgment does not require a literal 
reading of a legal authority when ―a myopic fixation on the literal 
language of the statute would cause an interpreter to miss [the] 
apparent meaning of the text.‖169 As Robert Gordon has argued: 
[L]awyers who recommend only the most literal forms of 
compliance and widen every loophole far enough to drive a 
truck through . . . will end up effectively frustrating the 
purposes of their clients as well as the legal rules. The lawyer 
under such an ethical regime is by vocation someone who 
helps clients find ways around the law.
170
 
Rule 2.1 affords confidentiality to attorney-client discussions at great 
societal cost in order to encourage attorney consultation and enhance 
                                                                                                                 
 
judgment, but must resist the client‘s insistence on a more favorable interpretation at the 
expense of such accuracy. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
166 Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 488, 489–90 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). The discussion in this and the 
following three paragraphs draws in part on my analysis of professional judgment in Michels, 
supra note 160, at 104–10. 
167 Id. 
168 Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 183 (1985) (footnote 
omitted). Brad Wendel argues persuasively that legal interpretation can and must transcend the 
subjective assessment of the attorney. The interpretive effort instead seeks to honor the purpose 
of the rule in question and is grounded in the interpretative standards of the relevant community. 
Wendel, FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 159, at § 6.3.  
169 Wendel, supra note 100, at 1187. 
170 Gordon, supra note 2, at 20–21.  
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legal compliance.
171
 Thus, the Rule requires counsel to use the 
accepted tools of interpretation to determine the accurate meaning of 
the statute or other legal authority uninfluenced by the client‘s 
objectives. 
 
When the client asks her attorney whether she may undertake a 
proposed action, the attorney may reach one of three conclusions after 
she has learned the facts and analyzed the legal propriety of a 
transaction. First, she may conclude that the transaction is proper. 
Second, she may conclude that the transaction is wrongful, i.e., 
criminal or fraudulent.
172
 The attorney should qualify these 
conclusions when there is genuine risk that a court will disagree with 
the attorney‘s conclusion.173 This qualification allows the client to 
understand the limits of the attorney‘s advice, and to govern his 
behavior mindful of the risk that a court may judge it differently than 
the lawyer.
174
 The qualification does not eliminate the attorney‘s 
ethical obligation to exercise independent professional judgment 
under Rule 2.1, however. The lawyer‘s advice, even when qualified, 
may prove decisive in the client‘s assessment of whether to undertake 
or refrain from the proposed action. Thus, the advice (and its 




                                                                                                                 
171 See supra Part III.B. 
172 For an explanation of why term ―wrongful‖ is limited to these instances, see supra 
notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
173 See Margolis Memorandum, supra note 11, at 68–69 (finding that ―Yoo and Bybee 
exercised poor judgment by overstating the certainty of their conclusions and underexposing 
countervailing arguments,‖ but concluding that the deficiencies did not rise to the level of 
professional misconduct). Under the interpretation of Rule 2.1 offered here, advice that claims 
or implies certainty when professional judgment dictates otherwise would violate Rule 2.1.  
174 Moreover, if there is a genuine risk that a court will disagree with the lawyer‘s 
interpretation, the ethical duties of competency and communication owed to the client require 
disclosure of such information to the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 
(2009) (requiring competent representation of clients); id. R. 1.4(b) (requiring that a lawyer 
explain the matter to a client to the extent reasonably necessary to allow the client to make 
informed decisions).  
175 Some attorneys prefer to couch their advice as an evaluation of the probability or 
likelihood that the proposed act will be deemed wrongful, rather than offering a conclusion 
about the propriety of the conduct coupled with qualifications. Both approaches are likely to 
influence the client‘s behavior and thus both are subject to the strictures of Model Rule 2.1 
discussed here; that is, regardless of its form, the attorney‘s advice must be guided and 
constrained by professional judgment. In regulating attorneys who render certain opinions that 
taxpayers use to avoid penalties, the Department of Treasury‘s regulations offer an interesting 
example outside the Model Rules context of the ―likelihood‖ approach. The regulations require 
that an attorney set forth ―the likelihood that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits‖ for each 
significant federal tax issue addressed in the opinion. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(ii) (2009). 
Moreover, if a practitioner ―fails to reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at least more 
likely than not‖ on a given issue, then the opinion cannot be relied on by the taxpayer to avoid 
penalties. Id.  
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A third possibility is indeterminacy;
176
 that is, in the professional 
judgment of counsel, it cannot be determined whether the transaction 
is criminal or fraudulent. A law is not indeterminate, however, simply 
because it requires interpretation or because the attorney‘s assessment 
is less than certain. Indeterminacy for our purposes signifies that the 
attorney cannot, by employing the interpretative standards that 




Because professional judgment is an act of constrained 
interpretation, lawyers may disagree in their assessment of the 
propriety of a proposed act and still be within the boundaries of 
professional judgment.
178
 Moreover, the test of compliance with the 
professional judgment element of Rule 2.1 is not an exercise in 
hindsight. The question is whether the attorney‘s interpretation was 
grounded in the standards of the professional community,
179
 not 
whether the attorney got the ―right‖ answer as measured by a 
subsequent court decision or other ruling on the matter.
180
 The 
converse, however, is equally true and critically important for our 
purposes here: while there may be more than one legitimate 
assessment of the client‘s proposed conduct, some assessments are 
unacceptable because they are beyond the boundaries of professional 
judgment.  
3. Candor 
The obligation under Rule 2.1 to report candidly to the client flows 
naturally from the requirement of independent professional judgment. 
Again, the goal is to ensure that the client receives an accurate 
assessment and refrains from activities that counsel has advised are 
wrongful. If independence and professional judgment increase the 
prospects that the attorney will make the correct assessment, then 
                                                                                                                 
176 But see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (suggesting that the term ―underdeterminate‖ may better 
capture the instance in which more than one, but not necessarily any, interpretation is 
legitimate). 
177 For a discussion of the significance of these three findings in the transactional context, 
see infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
178 See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 748 (1982) 
(noting that ―objectivity is compatible with a measure of disagreement‖). 
179 See Fiss, supra note 168, at 183 (noting in connection with legal decisions that 
―[a]dherence to the rules authorized by the professional community . . . provides the standards 
for evaluating the correctness of the judgment as a legal judgment‖ ). 
180 See Wendel, supra note 100, at 1195 (―An observer might disagree with B, and believe 
that A was the better result, but nevertheless concede that B was within the range of plausible, 
justifiable results.‖). For discussion of how courts might apply this standard in the disciplinary 
or liability setting, see infra Part V.C–D.  
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candor ensures that the assessment is accurately transmitted to the 
client. The attorney must resist the temptation to report what the 




The attorney need not limit her advice to a conclusion, of course. 
The attorney should explain how she reached the conclusion that she 
presents to the client.
182
 As noted earlier, when the law could 
legitimately be interpreted to support a contrary view, the attorney 
should disclose this fact to the client so the client understands that the 
attorney does not claim certainty in her conclusion.
183
 Of course, in 
the advisory role, the attorney typically does not dictate what action 
the client takes once he has the benefit of the attorney‘s accurate 
assessment of the propriety of the proposed action.
184
 As we shall see 
next, however, when the attorney takes steps to further the client‘s 
goals in the nonadvocacy setting, lawyer independence imposes even 
greater demands on counsel.  
C. Transactions  
As we have seen, the attorney must satisfy a number of lawyer-
independence obligations in advising the client on a question 
concerning the legal propriety of the client‘s proposed behavior. 
When the attorney furthers a transaction for the client, however, the 
attorney moves from advisor to facilitator of the client‘s actions. In 
the latter role, for reasons we shall discuss, lawyer independence is 
even more demanding of counsel. Properly understood, these 
demands can fundamentally change the role of the transactional 
lawyer.  
Suppose that an attorney for a corporation is retained to handle a 
real-estate syndication. Although the corporation‘s prior law firm and 
auditor recently resigned, the attorney accepts the financial 
information provided by the client, which she includes in the offering 
materials to investors.
185
 Suppose further that, based on the curious 
                                                                                                                 
181 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (―[A] lawyer should not 
be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the 
client.‖). 
182 See Wendel, supra note 100, at 1190 (transparent justification ―defends the judgment‘s 
objectivity against the critique that the interpreter is simply imposing her own policy 
preferences on the law.‖) 
183 See supra notes 166–67. 
184 The attorney may have obligations to ―report up‖ within the organization, however. See 
infra notes 259–64. 
185 The fact pattern is inspired by, but is not intended as an accurate summary of, FDIC v. 
O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), in 
which the Ninth Circuit analyzed the investors‘ claims under the duty of care, without 
considering Rule 2.1.  
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nature of the events, the lawyer has reason to suspect but does not 
know that the transaction is criminal or fraudulent. On the traditional 
understanding of the Model Rules, a lawyer—unencumbered by the 
demands of lawyer independence—would face no barriers under the 
attorney ethics rules to providing such assistance. Under Rule 1.2(d), 
the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct is criminal or 
fraudulent.
186
 The Model Rules, in turn, define ―knowingly‖ as ―actual 
knowledge of the fact in question.‖187 Therefore, while the attorney 
on our example harbors well-founded suspicions, they do not amount 




In this situation, the attorney may choose not to ask the client 
about her suspicions. If knowledge of wrongdoing is the test of 
whether the attorney can proceed, the attorney‘s ignorance here is a 
blessing of perverse kind. It rewards indifference or willful blindness 
of counsel. Why learn more, one might ask, when the client has not 
asked counsel to do so? Such knowledge is not necessary to fulfill the 
client‘s ends (on the client‘s reckoning, at least), and knowledge of 
wrongdoing—once gained—could preclude the attorney from 
assisting the client.
189
 In the corporate scandals of recent history, a 
regular defense—and not coincidentally a source of sharp criticism—
of transactional counsel was that they did not inquire into the bona 
fides of the transactions they furthered.
190
  
Now let us consider whether lawyer independence under our 
proposed construction of Rule 2.1 demands a different response. First, 
we concluded earlier that Rule 2.1 requires that counsel exercise 
independent professional judgment in providing nonadvocacy 
assistance to the client, which includes furthering client 
                                                                                                                 
186 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).  
187 Id. R. 1.0(f). 
188 See New York City Bar Report, supra note 8, at 453–54 (noting that the Model Rules 
contain no provision requiring further investigation when a lawyer suspects client wrongdoing). 
A central claim of this Article is that this reading of the Model Rules is correct as a general 
matter, but false when the lawyer is furthering a transaction that he has reason to suspect is 
wrongful. In the latter instance, the lawyer-independence demand of Model Rule 2.1 requires 
inquiry.  
189 One answer is that the client may benefit from input of counsel who is well informed 
about a transaction. As we have discussed, however, the protection of client interests is not the 
goal of lawyer independence and, therefore, can be waived by the client. See supra Parts III.D 
and IV.B.1.  
190 See, e.g., New York City Bar Report, supra note 8, at 431–32 (―[L]awyers, either in-
house or outside, appear to have been strategically positioned with respect to a significant 
number of these scandals. . . . Where questions were not asked or pressed, it is reasonable to 
believe that more assertive action might have avoided or mitigated wrongdoing in some of these 
situations.‖); Simon, supra note 9, at 1457 (noting, with respect to Enron, that ―[t]here is no 
indication that these professionals ever asked the question, ‗Is this misleading?‘‖). 
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transactions.
191
 Second, we have concluded that, when there is reason 
for concern about the propriety of a transaction, an attorney must 
obtain sufficient information before furthering the transaction in order 
to satisfy the procedural element of professional judgment.
192
 Thus, in 
our example, the circumstances require the attorney to inquire more 
deeply into the facts and circumstances before acting. A reasonable 
inquiry presumably would seek the reasons for the auditor and law 
firm‘s resignations, and, if their responses do not assuage the lawyer‘s 
suspicion that the proposed transaction is fraudulent, further inquiry 
into the bona fides of the financial statements that will ground the 
offering.
193
 Our concern here, however, is less with the particulars of 
the lawyer‘s inquiry, which necessarily vary with circumstance, than 
with the underlying principle: Rule 2.1 requires sufficient inquiry of 
counsel before furthering a transaction that counsel has reason to 
suspect is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer may also need to 
conduct research sufficient to determine the legal standards 
implicated by the facts and circumstances before acting.
194
 
The lawyer‘s obligation under Rule 2.1 to inquire into the facts 
and propriety of the transaction is not a general obligation of inquiry; 
it is, in fact, precisely contoured. The lawyer is obligated to inquire 
under the Rule only if she has reason for suspicion that the client‘s 
proposed transaction is wrongful and the attorney plans to assist the 
client in furthering the matter.
195
 Moreover, the client is free to refuse 
the lawyer‘s efforts to investigate the facts and research the law.196 
Adequate factual and legal knowledge remains, however, a condition 
of the lawyer‘s services prior to consummating a transaction that she 
                                                                                                                 
191 See supra Part III.C.2. 
192 See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.  
193 Although the context differs, ABA opinions considering the nature and extent of 
investigation necessary to offer an opinion letter are instructive here. See ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974) (―If any of the alleged facts, or the 
alleged facts taken as a whole, are incomplete in a material respect; or are suspect; or are 
inconsistent; or either on their face or on the basis of other known facts are open to question, the 
lawyer should make further inquiry.‖); ABA Comm. on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion 
Principles, 53 BUS. LAW. 831, 833 (1998) (requiring further inquiry if information ―appears 
irregular on its face or has been provided by an inappropriate source‖). 
194 See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
195 For this reason, Model Rule 2.1 as interpreted here is entirely consistent with the 
ABA‘s comment that the Rule does not require the attorney to initiate investigation of the client. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (2009). When the client has asked the 
attorney to further a client transaction, he has asked the attorney to ―represent‖ him in the 
matter. Thus, the attorney is not investigating the client ―out of the blue‖ or on her own 
initiative; she is gaining the information necessary to exercise independent professional 
judgment in a matter in which she is already representing the client. See id. R. 2.1 (requiring 
independent professional judgment in ―representing a client‖). For an analysis of why Rule 2.1 
applies in the transaction setting generally, see supra Part III.C.2.  
196 See supra Part III.D.  
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has reason to suspect is criminal or fraudulent. Thus, while the client 
has a right to refuse counsel‘s efforts to learn more, the lawyer who is 
denied such access has no choice but to withdraw from the matter, 
since to proceed in ignorance would violate Rule 2.1.
197
  
After counsel has exercised independent professional judgment to 
(1) determine the facts, and (2) access the legal propriety of a 
transaction that posed reason for concern, she may reach one of three 
conclusions as discussed in Part IV(B)(2). First, if counsel concludes 
that the transaction is proper, i.e., not criminal or fraudulent, the 
attorney can consummate the transaction. Second, if counsel 
concludes that the transaction is criminal or fraudulent, she may not 
assist the client in the transaction.
198
 In this instance, Rule 2.1 plays a 
critical role in the transactional setting: it eliminates willful blindness 
by insisting that an attorney gain knowledge before furthering a 
suspect transaction. That knowledge, in turn, triggers an obligation 
that can no longer be circumvented through ignorance—to withhold 
complicity in a transaction that the lawyer now knows is wrongful.
199
  
Third, if counsel concludes that, despite employing the 
interpretative standards that comprise independent professional 
judgment, she cannot determine whether the transaction is criminal or 
fraudulent (―indeterminate‖ or ―indeterminacy‖),200 the attorney‘s role 
is governed by Rule 1.2(d). Rule 1.2(d), while prohibiting knowing 
assistance of a client‘s criminal or fraudulent behavior, permits 
attorneys to ―counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.‖201  
A lawyer who consummates a criminal or fraudulent client 
transaction without knowledge of its wrongful nature is subject to 
three challenges under the construction of lawyer independence 
offered here. First, did the proposed transaction present reasonable 
grounds for the lawyer to suspect that it was wrongful? If not, then 
Rule 2.1 does not impose a barrier to furthering the transaction. If the 
                                                                                                                 
197 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring counsel to withdraw from 
representation that will result in violation of the Model Rules). 
198 Id. R. 1.2(d) (prohibiting attorney from assisting client in transaction that lawyer knows 
is ―criminal or fraudulent‖). A more delicate question is whether the lawyer can assist the client 
when she believes that the law prohibiting the proposed action is invalid. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 cmt. e (2000) (discussing the standards for 
testing the legal validity or applicability of a law).  
199 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d). 
200 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting that a matter is not indeterminate 
simply because it requires interpretation).  
201 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(2)(b) (prohibiting knowing assistance of crime or fraud but 
allowing the lawyer to ―counsel or assist a client in conduct when the lawyer reasonably 
believes . . . that the client can assert a nonfrivolous argument that the client‘s conduct will not 
constitute a crime or fraud or violate a court order‖).  
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transaction presented such grounds, however, our next question is 
whether the attorney gained the requisite factual and legal information 
to assess the bona fides of the transaction? If not, then the attorney 
has perforce failed to exercise the professional judgment required by 
Rule 2.1, since the judgment—to the extent it was exercised at all—
was insufficiently informed.
202
 Third, was the attorney‘s conclusion 
that the transaction was proper independent of the client and within 
the boundaries of professional judgment?
203
 If not, then the attorney 
has violated Rule 2.1.  
This construction of the independence requirement of Model Rule 
2.1 would represent a significant change in the attorney‘s 
responsibilities in furthering transactions. Absent our proposed 
reading of Model Rule 2.1, attorneys would be free to consummate 
such transactions under the ethics rules, even when they have reason 
to suspect client wrongdoing, because such suspicion does not rise to 
the level of knowledge that requires withdrawal.
204
 On the 
interpretation of Model Rule 2.1 offered here, however, counsel can 
no longer remain uninformed or agnostic about the propriety of the 
transaction she furthers: with respect to the transaction‘s propriety, 
her participation is, in an important sense, her imprimatur. 
V. AN INVITATION TO THE STATES 
A. Introduction  
Our final question is how the states can implement the new 
understanding of lawyer independence developed in this Article. We 
will begin with a discussion of the role of the states in advancing the 
law of lawyering and how that role relates to the interpretation of 
lawyer independence offered here.
205
 Next, we consider how our 
proposed interpretation would play out in the two theaters that 
address attorney conduct—discipline and liability. Finally, we explore 
how the lawyer-independence standard proposed here relates to the 
                                                                                                                 
202 For a discussion of this procedural element of professional judgment, see supra notes 
162–64. 
203 For a discussion of how this standard should be applied by courts, see infra Part V. 
204 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (collecting sources objecting to the passive 
role of counsel in transactions resulting in crimes or fraud).  
205 Reform by the states of the law of lawyer independence will also have a substantial 
effect on the federal courts, which typically apply the attorney ethics rules of the state in which 
they sit. E.g., W.D. WASH. G.R. 2(e), available at http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/documents 
/HomePageAnnouncements/2009%20Local%20Rules/Final%20Local%20General%20Rules%2
0for%20website.pdf (requiring compliance with the ―Washington Rules of Professional 
Conduct, as promulgated, amended, and interpreted by the Washington State Supreme 
Court . . . and the decisions of any court applicable thereto‖). See generally HAZARD & HODES, 
supra note 1, § 1.17 (providing background on attorney ethics in federal courts).  
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lawyer‘s duties under other lawyering standards, including Sarbanes-
Oxley and Model Rule 1.13.  
B. The Opportunity for Reform  
Attorney regulation is generally the province of the states.
206
 
Nearly every state has adopted an attorney ethics code grounded on 
the Model Rules drafted by the American Bar Association.
207
 The 
states typically construe these ethics rules in four settings: through 
committee opinions that guide the day-to-day practice of attorneys;
208 
in the attorney-disciplinary setting, where attorneys are sanctioned for 
violations of the rules and the decisions interpreting them;
209
 in the 
litigation setting, where ethics rules that bear on the conduct of 
counsel are interpreted and applied;
210
 and in liability cases against 
counsel as evidence of the standard of care.
211
 Each of these 
committee or court interpretations of the Model Rules establishes 
precedent that can shape the behavior of attorneys in the jurisdiction. 
The state-based nature of attorney regulation offers a special 
opportunity for reform of the law of lawyer independence. In the 
years since the states adopted their own versions of the Model 
Rules,
212
 each has imposed its own interpretive imprint on the law of 
lawyer conduct—through its committee and court interpretations of 
the rules in the advisory, disciplinary, and litigation settings.
213
 Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
206 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.3 (cataloging the sources of the law of 
lawerying). In recent years, the federal government has increasingly regulated attorneys, often in 
specialized areas. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 961 
(2009) (describing the growth of federal regulation of attorney ethics). Part V.E., infra, will 
consider an important instance of federal attorney regulation, Sarbanes-Oxley, and its relation to 
the interpretation of Model Rule 2.1 proposed herein.  
207 See LAWYERS‘ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 01:11 to :82 (July 27, 2005) (describing how 
the ethics rules adopted in each state differ from the Model Rules). In this Part V, we will 
continue our discussion of the Model Rules because they are in effect in nearly every 
jurisdiction. See supra note 4. In actual court cases, however, a committee or court would apply 
the ethics rule in effect in its jurisdiction. The states have for the most part adopted Model Rule 
2.1 without substantial change. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.  
208 See, e.g., In re Goldstein, 560 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.J. 1989) (holding that lawyers can be 
disciplined for failure to comply with committee opinions construing the Model Rules). 
209 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. b (2000) 
(discussing enforcement of ethics rules). 
210 See generally LAWYERS‘ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 799:201 to :310 (May 26, 2010) 
(collecting court cases construing attorney ethics rules across jurisdictions in litigated matters). 
211 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 20 (2009) (―[A] lawyer‘s violation of a 
Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.‖); see also Developments 
in the Law: Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1567 
(1994) (noting that most courts allow discussion of ethics violation as evidence of negligence by 
counsel).  
212 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
213 See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.  
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the law governing lawyers, although uniform in its general outline, is 
subject to considerable variation among the states in its particulars. 
Unlike corporation law, states are not engaged in a ―race to the 
bottom‖ in lawyer regulation.214 In fact, states visualize themselves 
more as gatekeepers of the bar to protect the public, by administering 
the bar exam, imposing character and fitness checks, and having 
continuing-legal-education requirements.
215
 In many ways, the state-
by-state approach to lawyer regulation offers the long-claimed 
opportunity of federalism: the states serve as laboratories to 
experiment and change the law governing lawyers.  
The lawyer-independence reforms presented in this Article require 
no revision of the state-specific Rules of Professional Conduct 
because nearly every state has adopted Rule 2.1.
216
 Instead, this 
Article proposes that states analyze and apply the Rule in a manner 
that is consistent with: its text and history, the Rule‘s relationship to 
the other Model Rules, and our understanding of the profession and its 
commitments. It is a call, therefore, for courts and ethics committees 
to breathe life into Rule 2.1 and lawyer independence, not through 
wholesale change, but by reasoned interpretation and construction of 
a Rule that is already on their books. If states are troubled by the 
corporate scandals of recent decades and the passivity of lawyers who 
                                                                                                                 
214 Corporation-law scholars do not universally accept the implication of the phrase ―race 
to the bottom.‖ See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 130 
(2009) (noting that corporation law can be viewed as a race to the bottom if corporate statutes 
are directed at managers who make reincorporation decisions, and a race to the top if the goal is 
to satisfy shareholders).  
215 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2 (2000) (discussing 
admission to the practice of law). 
216 The language of the ABA‘s Model Rule 2.1 has been adopted verbatim by forty-four 
states. Three states have adopted it with additional language concerning alternative dispute 
resolution (Alaska, Colorado and Hawaii). See Links to Other Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility Pages, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) 
(providing links to ethics rules of each state). Georgia and Texas have adopted versions of 
Model Rule 2.1 with slight modifications. Texas‘s version reads in its entirety: ―In advising or 
otherwise representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice.‖ TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.01 (2005), 
available at http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Grievance_Info_and_Ethics 
_Helpline&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=96. The version of Rule 2.1 
adopted in Georgia reads: ―In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice. A lawyer shall not be deterred from giving 
candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. The maximum 
penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.‖ GA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R 2.1 
(2001), available at http://www.gabar.org/handbook/part_iv_after_january_1_2001_-_georgia_ 
rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_21_advisor. And finally, the California State Bar Board of 
Governors recommended the adoption of Model Rule 2.1 in September 2009. However, the 
proposal has not yet been approved by the Supreme Court of California. Proposed Rules of 
Professional Conduct, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Committees/ 
RulesCommission/ProposedRulesofProfessionalConduct.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).  
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counseled these corporations and furthered their transactions,
217
 the 
tools of reform are well within reach. The states already insist on 
lawyer independence in name; it is now time to insist on it in practice.  
It is worth reflecting on why Rule 2.1 has been largely moribund 
for ethical and liability purposes;
218
 and why the Rule—once 
understood—will require the close attention of courts, disciplinary 
authorities, practitioners, and harmed third parties. By assuming that 
Rule 2.1 is simply another means to protect clients,
219
 the courts have 
marginalized its disciplinary and liability significance. The client is 
not likely to file a disciplinary action against a lawyer for providing 
advice or furthering a transaction that is consistent with the client‘s 
wishes but risks harming third parties through wrongful conduct. 
Thus, a lack of lawyer independence is rarely a source of client 
grievance. For a client who is aggrieved by the lawyer‘s failure to 
provide accurate advice with respect to the state of the law or to 
handle a matter properly, the ethical breach—if any—is a failure of 
competence,
220
 not independence. Moreover, the client‘s principal 
liability remedy for inaccurate advice is a malpractice claim against 




When we replace the faulty agency-based conception of Rule 2.1 
with its real purpose—the protection of society and third parties 
against client wrongdoing
222—the disciplinary and liability 
implications of the Rule come into bold relief. Third parties and 
society can be harmed by an absence of lawyer independence. Third 
parties and society, not clients, have reason and incentive to invoke 
the Rule in the disciplinary and liability setting. We will consider next 
how our proposed interpretation of Rule 2.1 plays out in such settings. 
                                                                                                                 
217 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
218 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
219 See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. 
220 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (―A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.‖); see also In re 
Odman, 687 P.2d 153, 156 (Or. 1984) (per curiam) (disciplining lawyer for incompetent 
handling of estate).  
221 See LUBAN, supra note 15, at 155 (suggesting that there are no cases of discipline on 
attorneys for violating Rule 2.1 because clients are more interested in malpractice damages than 
in pursuing ethical grievances); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 52 (2000) (treating incompetent representation principally as a breach of duty of 
care); 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 30, § 19.1 (discussing competency and its relation to 
duty of care).  
222 See supra notes 76–85. 
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C. Attorney Discipline 
If Model Rule 2.1 is designed to protect society and third parties 
against client harm through the exercise of lawyer independence, our 
next question is how the disciplinary system can protect either interest 
under the Rule. Consider two scenarios. First, suppose that a client‘s 
criminal or fraudulent transaction harms a third party. Prior to acting, 
the client sought the advice of counsel. Let us assume that the 
attorney had no knowledge of the fraud but failed to exercise 
independent professional judgment in advising the client that the 
transaction was wrongful. For our second scenario, assume that the 
attorney was not asked about the propriety of the transaction 
described above, but furthered it without inquiry despite reasonable 
grounds to suspect client wrongdoing.  
On either scenario, the harmed third party could file an ethics 
complaint against counsel for breach of Rule 2.1. If these complaints 
have not been filed thus far, it is likely because few have understood 
the third-party-protection rationale of the Rule, and ethics committees 
and courts have not explored the implications of the third-party-
protection purpose of the Rule to determine when the Rule applies or 
what it requires of counsel, the subjects of Parts III and IV above. 
Given that Rule 2.1 is designed to protect third parties, it follows that 
disciplinary authorities should recognize the grievance of a third party 
who was harmed by its breach.
223
 
Parts III and IV have offered an analysis of when Rule 2.1 applies 
and what it requires of counsel. These standards should be applied by 
a disciplinary tribunal in assessing an alleged violation of the Rule. In 
the each of the scenarios described above, under our proposed 
construction of Rule 2.1, counsel is required to exercise independent 
professional judgment. The requirements of the Rule are triggered not 
only when counsel provides advice, but also when she has reason to 
suspect wrongdoing in a transaction that she is furthering.
224
  
The next question posed by these scenarios is how a disciplinary 
tribunal can determine whether counsel has exercised the independent 
professional judgment required by the Rule. Professional judgment, 
                                                                                                                 
223 Some states generally allow any person to file a disciplinary grievance against an 
attorney, regardless of their personal stake in the case. E.g., N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37A(II)(a)(2)(A)–
(B), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-37a.htm (―Any person may file a 
grievance with the attorney discipline office to call to its attention the conduct of an attorney 
that he or she believes constitutes misconduct which should be investigated by the attorney 
discipline office.‖). In states that consider the grievances only of those personally affected by 
the alleged violation, the grievance of a third party who is harmed by the alleged violation of 
Model Rule 2.1 would qualify for consideration. 
224 See supra Part IV.B.2.  
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we have determined, has both a procedural element—requiring 
inquiry to gain sufficient factual and legal information—and a 
substantive element—requiring counsel‘s conclusions to be within the 
bounded range of professional judgment.
225
 The first question poses 
few substantive concerns; it asks only whether the attorney‘s inquiry 
into the facts and law was sufficient to render an informed judgment 
in the scenarios described above.
226
  
The more difficult question is how a disciplinary tribunal or court 
can evaluate compliance with the independent-professional-judgment 
standard when the lawyer has satisfied the procedural requirements of 
the Rule, but reached an incorrect conclusion about the propriety of 
the proposed conduct or transaction. An incorrect assessment is not 
tantamount to a failure to exercise independent professional 
judgment. On the other hand, independent professional judgment is 
not a subjective exercise for which any answer is acceptable.
227
  
Although law often requires interpretation, there is typically a limit 
on the range of legitimate interpretations to any given question. As 
noted earlier, the term ―professional‖ constrains the attorney‘s 
judgment, and provides the standard by which to evaluate the 
judgment of the attorney. The remaining question is whether the 
attorney‘s interpretation is within the acceptable boundaries of the 
professional community at the time the advice was given.
228
 
Ultimately, a disciplinary proceeding addressing an attorney‘s 
failure to exercise independent professional judgment is committed to 
the notion that the law is sufficiently objective to evaluate when an 
attorney has strayed beyond professional limits in assessing the 
propriety of the client‘s conduct. The fact that judgment is at issue is 
not reason to deem the question irretrievably subjective. Even a more 
basic allegation of wrongdoing under the ethics rules, a grievance 
alleging that counsel provided incompetent advice to the client in 
violation of Rule 1.1, requires judgment regarding what advice the 
lawyer should have provided the client.
229
 Just as incorrect advice of 
counsel is not a stand-alone basis for a finding that the attorney 
                                                                                                                 
225 See supra Part III.C.  
226 See supra notes 155–58. 
227 See supra notes 178–80. 
228 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. States typically refuse to admit expert 
testimony on whether the attorney violated an attorney ethics rule in an attorney disciplinary 
proceeding. E.g., In re McKechnie, 657 N.W.2d 287, 290 (N.D. 2003) (viewing the expert 
testimony as unnecessary to assist the trier of fact). An open question is whether expert 
testimony on the interpretive standards of the legal community would fall within this 
proscription.  
229 See Model Rules of Prof‘l Conduct R. 1.1 (2009) (―A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.‖). 
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advice was incompetent,
230
 disagreement among counsel or even 
disagreement between the attorney‘s advice and a subsequent court 
finding, is not sufficient for a finding that an attorney breached Rule 
2.1. Under both rules, however, some advice is objectively beyond 
the acceptable range of under the circumstances.  
D. Attorney Liability  
Unlike a disciplinary proceeding, a civil claim may result in 
financial recompense for the victim of the crime or fraud that lawyer 
independence could have prevented. Thus, third parties have an even 
greater incentive to seek civil recovery for a failure of lawyer 
independence. The question, however, is whether attorneys can be 
held liable to third parties who are harmed by the lawyer‘s failure to 
exercise independence that could have prevented the wrongdoing. In 
this Section, we will explore whether third parties have a claim for 
such failing, how the claim relates to Rule 2.1, and how a failure of 
lawyer independence can be evidenced in such a claim.  
Whether and when an attorney owes a duty of care to a third party 
are questions that have generated substantial disagreement among the 
states.
231
 Courts have adopted a variety of different approaches.
232
 
Some have denied such claims altogether based on an absence of 
privity.
233
 Others allow claims under third-party-beneficiary law
234
 or 
the invitation-to-rely standard of the Restatement.
235
 Still others have 
                                                                                                                 
230 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 3–5 (noting in connection with the 
competency requirement of Model Rule 1.1 that a ―thoughtful opinion on a difficult or unsettled 
question is not incompetent even if it later proves to have been wrong‖).  
231 Kevin H. Michels, Third-Party Negligence Claims Against Counsel: A Proposed 
Unified Liability Standard, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143, 148 (2009). In order to prevail on a 
duty of care claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of 
care; (2) the defendant breached such duty; (3) such breach was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff‘s harm; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164–65 (5th ed. 1984). The first of these elements is 
the subject of our inquiry here.  
232 For a detailed discussion and critical analysis of each of these approaches, see Michels, 
supra note 231, at 150–59. 
233 See, e.g., Bryant v. Robledo, 938 So. 2d 413, 422 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (holding that 
an essential element of a malpractice claim is the existence of an attorney-client relationship); 
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316 (App. Div. 1990) (finding lack 
of privity and, therefore, denying claims of investors against law firm that prepared tax opinion 
letters). See generally MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 30, § 7.7 (collecting decisions that require 
privity).  
234 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 cmt. b (1981) (―[T]he parties to a 
contract have the power, if they so intend, to create a right in a third person.‖). A leading case 
applying this standard to the question of whether an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient is Guy 
v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 752–53 (Pa. 1983) (weighing the increased concern over liability 
for lawyers with the lack of recourse for nonclients).  
235 A lawyer owes a duty to a nonclient if the lawyer or client ―invited‖ the nonclient to 
rely on the lawyer‘s opinion or provision of other legal services and the third party is not too 
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applied a more expansive approach, such as California‘s balancing 
test, which asks whether the balance of factors justifies an extension 
of the duty to a third party.
236
 An insistence on privity would, of 
course, eliminate the attorney‘s liability to a nonclient who suffers 
harm as a result of the attorney‘s failure to exercise independent 
judgment in advising the client or furthering a transaction. Moreover, 
a court applying either the third-party-beneficiary or the 
Restatement‘s invitation-to-rely standard is not likely to recognize 
such a third-party claim because, in most cases, neither attorney nor 
client will have intended to benefit the third party or extended an 
invitation to such third party to rely on any statement or services 
related to the harm. 
Under the California balancing approach, however, the courts 
consider a variety of factors in determining whether the attorney owes 
a duty to a third party, including: 
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the 
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant‘s conduct and the injury 
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant‘s 
conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
 237
 
Although the court originally applied these factors to defendants other 
than attorneys, the courts now apply the test to determine whether 
attorneys owe a duty to third parties if liability will not ―impose an 
undue burden on the profession.‖238  
Courts that incline toward the California balancing approach
239
 or 
some version of a negligence standard,
240
 may extend a duty of care 
                                                                                                                 
 
remote to warrant such protection. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 51(2) (2000). 
236 E.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (balancing of various factors to 
determine whether a lawyer will be liable to a third person not in privity). 
237 Id. 
238 Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961). 
239 E.g., Goldberger v. Kaplan, Strangis & Kaplan, P.A., 534 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995) (using a balancing of factors in determining whether an attorney owes a duty to a 
third party); Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 534 N.W.2d 734, 627 (Mo. 1995) 
(explaining the use of the balancing test as a means of determining ―whether non-client 
beneficiaries of a will could maintain a legal malpractice action‖). 
240 In an earlier work, I have argued that an ―ethical differentiation‖ standard represents the 
better approach to determining when to recognize third-party duties of care: attorneys should 
owe duties to third parties when negligence standards would generally recognize such duties 
and the attorney ethics rules do not impose a countervailing obligation on counsel. Michels, 
supra note 231, at 147. 
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from the attorney to a third party who is harmed by an attorney‘s 
failure to exercise independent professional judgment in counseling 
the client. Consider the earlier example in which an attorney has 
reason to suspect that a corporate client‘s transaction is wrongful but 
closes the transaction without a deeper inquiry. Although counsel 
would not ―know‖ of any wrongdoing, her actions in furthering the 
transaction under these circumstances would violate the independent-
professional-judgment standard developed herein. If the transaction 
proves to be criminal or fraudulent and a third party commences an 
action against the attorney for damages caused by the wrongful 
transaction, a court would have to determine whether the attorney 
owed a duty of care to the third party.  
A number of factors support extension of such duty under the 
California balancing standard in this example.
241
 First, the plaintiff 
was party to the transaction that harmed her, so the transaction was 
intended to ―affect‖ her. Second, harm to a third party is foreseeable 
based on the attorney‘s efforts to consummate a transaction without 
inquiring into circumstances that reasonably suggested that the 
transaction was criminal or fraudulent.
242
 The attorney‘s failure to 
inquire is ―closely‖ linked with the harm, since the suspected 
wrongdoing would, if true, directly harm the third party. There is, 
moreover, a troubling moral indifference implicated by an attorney‘s 
actions to further a transaction that she reasonably suspects is 
criminal or fraudulent. Finally, if we believe that some of the 
corporate scandals of recent decades could have been prevented had 
counsel not closed transactions while ignoring signs of their wrongful 
nature, then for policy reasons alone, courts have ample incentive to 
enforce the duty of lawyer independence.  
Moreover, the recognition of counsel‘s duty to a third party under 
these circumstances would not conflict with any ethical obligation of 
the attorney.
243
 First, Model Rule 2.1 requires the lawyer to exercise 
independent professional judgment, and therefore the attorney‘s 
ethical obligations are entirely consistent with the duty of care to the 
third party. Second, this duty would not undermine the attorney‘s 
confidentiality obligation because the attorney is allowed to disclose 
client information to ―respond to allegations in any proceeding 
                                                                                                                 
241 See supra notes 236–238. 
242 While it is not certain that the transaction would prove wrongful and harm the third 
party, given the attorney‘s reasonable suspicion the prospects of such harm are quite high. The 
California test requires foreseeability, not certainty. See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 
(Cal. 1958). 
243 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.  
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concerning the lawyer‘s representation of the client.‖244 Thus, under 
the ―balancing‖ test of whether a duty is owed to third parties, a court 
has a basis to extend a duty of care to a third party who was harmed 




In addition, when an attorney‘s alleged negligence stems from an 
omission or failure to act, as here, professional standards creating a 
duty to a third party support the imposition of a duty of care on 
counsel.
246
 In the hypothetical, this Article‘s proposed construction of 
Rule 2.1 requires counsel to undertake further inquiry to assess the 
propriety of the transaction when there is reason for suspicion of 
wrongdoing. Thus, the attorney ethics rules impose a professional 
obligation on counsel to take affirmative action that, in turn, can 
support imposition of a duty of care to third parties.
247
 
In the example offered above, the attorney‘s failing was 
procedural: she neglected to inquire into the suspicious facts and 
circumstances before furthering the transaction.
248
 Suppose, however, 
that the failing was substantive—that the attorney gained the requisite 
information but concluded that the transaction was not criminal or 
                                                                                                                 
244 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009). The Official Comments to the 
Model Rules affirm, moreover, that the right to disclose client information in response to a 
claim of lawyer wrongdoing applies in the civil, disciplinary, and criminal setting, and extends 
to instances in which the attorney responds to an allegation of wrongdoing by a third party. Id. 
R. 1.6 cmt. 10. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers likewise permits a 
lawyer to disclose ―otherwise confidential client information‖ in response to an assertion by a 
nonclient that the lawyer ―engaged in wrongdoing in the course of representing a client.‖ 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. g (2000) (allowing such 
disclosure ―despite the fact that the client involved has not waived confidentiality or had any 
role in threatening or making the charges‖). In order to preserve the confidentiality of the 
client‘s consultation with counsel regarding the propriety of the client‘s proposed conduct, the 
attorney‘s advice should not, absent special circumstances, be admissible in a criminal or third-
party civil action against the client. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text (explaining 
why confidentiality is afforded to such discussions).  
245 Likewise, the extension of a duty of care to the third party would satisfy the ethical-
differentiation test that I have proposed elsewhere. See supra notes 231 and 240. The client 
would likely also share liability for the wrongdoing, and the attorney‘s liability would therefore 
be reduced under comparative liability principles. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 7 (2000) (explaining the basic rules of comparative 
liability).  
246 E.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (―[T]he 
relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient gives rise to an affirmative duty for the 
benefit of third persons.‖); Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 820–21 (Tenn. 1997) (―[A] duty 
of care may exist where a psychiatrist, in accordance with professional standards, knows or 
reasonably should know that a patient poses an unreasonable risk of harm to a foreseeable, 
readily identifiable third person.‖).  
247 While ethical duties can inform a court‘s extension of duties of care for omissions that 
foreseeably harm third parties, they do not provide a cause of action, which remains tort based. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 scope [20] (―Violation of a Rule should not 
itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer.‖). 
248 See supra notes 162–64. 
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fraudulent and thereafter consummated the transaction. The question 
on these facts is whether an attorney applying the interpretive 
standards and norms of the legal community could have reached that 
conclusion.
249
 The latter question is no more open-ended than the 
standards that accompany malpractice claims against counsel 
generally. Malpractice asks whether the attorney‘s advice or conduct 
was consistent with what an ordinarily skilled lawyer would have 
done in the circumstances.
250
 Both questions therefore require expert 
testimony of other professionals to describe the professional standards 
accepted by the community and their application to the circumstances 
faced by counsel. 
E. Relation to Other Standards 
We have already discussed the relation of Rule 2.1 to other ethics 
rules designed to protect the client. Rule 2.1, properly understood, is 
designed to protect third parties and society against client wrongdoing 
that lawyer independence could prevent.
251
 Thus, courts must resist 
the temptation to interpret Rule 2.1 as a call for competency and 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, each of which is addressed 
expressly by other ethics rules.
252
 
Our next question is how our proposed interpretation of Rule 2.1 
relates to the ―reporting up‖ rules traditionally invoked when 
questions of client fraud arise. Specifically, we will address how Rule 
2.1 interacts with Sarbanes-Oxley,
253
 a federal statute adopted in the 
wake of Enron and the other corporate scandals of the 2000s;
254
 and 
Model Rule 1.13, an ethics rule modified in part as a response to these 




The most basic requirement of Rule 2.1—that an attorney exercise 
independent professional judgment in advising the client—is simply 
not addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley or any other ethics rule. As we have 
argued in Part II, legal ethics without lawyer independence is 
                                                                                                                 
249 See supra notes 166–79. 
250 E.g., Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 593 (Cal. 1975) (looking to the law that was 
available to the lawyer at the time he performed legal services for his client).  
251 See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 62–76. 
253 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).  
254 See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (explaining the background and need for 
legislation in the wake of corporate scandals). 
255 See generally Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The 
Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1089 (2006).  
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essentially agency law tailored to fit the particulars of the legal 
setting. If we are to honor the third-party and societal-protection 
concerns of lawyer independence, however, agency principles must 
give way when lawyer independence is required. In practice, this 
means that the client‘s general right to control the scope of the 
representation under Rule 1.2(d) is superseded by the independence 
demands of Rule 2.1.
256
 Conversely, if we are not to intrude 
unjustifiably on the client‘s right to shape the representation, courts 
must establish clear standards for when Rule 2.1 applies and when it 
does not.
257
 In the transactional setting, under our proposed 
interpretation of Rule 2.1, the attorney has a special obligation of 
further factual inquiry and legal assessment when the client asks her 
to assess the propriety of a proposed action or further a transaction 
that counsel has reason to suspect is wrongful.
258
 No other ethics rule 
demands this of counsel, which leaves a troubling lacuna if we ignore 
the demands of lawyer independence.  
The ―reporting up‖ rules likewise address issues distinct from Rule 
2.1, properly understood. The regulations promulgated by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission under Sarbanes-Oxley impose 
obligations on counsel for a publicly held company who discovers 
evidence of the company‘s ―material violation of securities law or 
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation.‖259 Under Sarbanes-
Oxley and its regulations, the lawyer is required to report such 
wrongdoing to certain company officials or a committee within the 
company, and in some instances is permitted to report it beyond the 
company.
260
 Similarly, Model Rule 1.13 requires reporting within the 
organization and, in limited circumstances, beyond the organization 
when the attorney ―knows‖ of certain types of wrongdoing.261  
Sarbanes-Oxley and Model Rule 1.13 are thus designed to 
eliminate attorney silence when the attorney is aware of past, present, 
or ongoing client wrongdoing. Neither addresses the central concerns 
of lawyer independence, however. Rule 2.1, as proposed here, insists 
that an attorney: accurately assess the propriety of the client‘s 
proposed transaction when asked, and ask questions, learn more, and 
accurately assess a transaction that counsel has reason to suspect is 
wrongful before providing assistance on such transaction.
262
 Rule 
                                                                                                                 
256 See supra Part III.D.  
257 See supra Part III.C. 
258 See supra Part IV.C.  
259 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2006). 
260 17 C.F.R.§ 205.3(d)(2) (2009).  
261 Model Rules OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2009). 
262 See supra Part V.B.  
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1.13, by contrast, requires no action of counsel unless the attorney 
―knows‖ of client wrongdoing. The attorney‘s obligations under 
Sarbanes-Oxley are triggered when counsel ―becomes aware of 
evidence of a material violation‖ of the client,263 a standard more 
demanding than knowledge but substantially less demanding than the 
―reasonable suspicion‖ that triggers further inquiry by the transaction 
lawyer under Rule 2.1.
264
 
Although lawyer independence differs in kind from the reporting-
up rules of Sarbanes-Oxley and Model Rule 1.13, the standards are 
complementary.
265
 Sarbanes-Oxley and Rule 1.13 explain what 
counsel should do when she is aware or has knowledge of client 
wrongdoing.
266
 The lawyer-independence standard proposed here 
addresses the prior question: when do attorneys have an obligation to 
gain such awareness or knowledge?  
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is easy to see how lawyers might be confused about the positive 
law of lawyer independence, which is our shorthand term for the 
―independent professional judgment and candor‖ required of counsel 
by Rule 2.1. We have identified three assumptions about legal 
practice that run against the grain of independence. First, under the 
traditional understanding of legal practice, the client is the principal 
and the lawyer the agent—an understanding that emphasizes 
                                                                                                                 
263 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c); see also id. § 205.2(e) (―Evidence of a material violation 
means credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, 
for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material 
violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.‖). Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley is implicated 
when the attorney becomes ―aware‖ that what has occurred is about to occur is evidently 
wrongful, rather than the proposed standard‘s insistence on further inquiry by counsel when the 
attorney has reason for concern about the propriety of a proposed transaction, but does not yet 
have credible evidence that it is wrongful. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51,715, 51,727 n.105 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) 
(―‗Aware‘ is a commonly used and well-defined English word, meaning ‗having knowledge; 
conscious; cognizant.‘‖). 
264 In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley applies only to attorneys for publicly held companies, 17 
C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2009), whereas MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) applies 
to attorneys regardless of client type, including public and private corporations.  
265 Sarbanes-Oxley does not preempt our proposed interpretation of Model Rule 2.1 
because the latter does not affect or diminish any obligation under Sarbanes-Oxley. See 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the 
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,320, 6,320 (Feb. 6, 2003) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (noting that regulations are ―not intended to limit the ability of 
any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not inconsistent with the 
application of this part‖). 
266 In addition, Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits counsel from assisting a client transaction that 
counsel knows is wrongful. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d). Under Model Rule 
1.16(a), counsel must withdraw from a client matter that ―will result in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law.‖ Id. at R. 1.16(a). 
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fulfillment of client objectives as the central task of counsel. On this 
agency understanding, the lawyer sees herself as dedicated to 
assisting the client without imposing restraints on that representation. 
As a second consequence of the agency paradigm, an attorney sees 
her duty to provide accurate advice to the client as part of the 
lawyer‘s obligation to serve the client competently—not to 
differentiate from client goals in service of some other interest. Third, 
advocacy casts a long shadow over the legal profession, and there are 
valid reasons why lawyers should not limit the client‘s claim to only 
those arguments that the attorney, in her independent professional 
judgment, deems valid.   
In treating advocacy as the defining metaphor for the profession, 
however, the third assumption deceives us into assuming that 
professional judgment cannot constrain our actions outside the 
advocacy role. An underappreciated insight, however, of the 1970 
reforms of the attorney ethics rules is that the attorney as counselor 
should not be bound by the same ethical standards as her litigation 
counterpart. Advocacy is founded on a different rationale, serves 
different objectives, and has protections against wrongdoing that 
counseling does not. Thus, Rule 2.1 is addressed to the nonadvocacy 
roles of counsel.  
Although the lawyer-as-agent paradigm captures an important 
aspect of lawyering and accounts for much of our vision of the 
profession, it does not explain attorney independence. Rule 2.1 
provides that in ―representing a client, counsel shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖ The 
Rule on its face is a departure from general agency principles, which 
do not ask that the agent exercise independent judgment. The text, 
context, history, and rationale of Model Rule 2.1 suggest that the 
attorney‘s independent professional judgment is not simply a 
superfluous restatement of the attorney‘s obligations to represent the 
client competently, to provide the client with full information to make 
informed decisions, and to avoid conflicts of interest. Each of these 
requirements is addressed expressly and with greater precision by 
other provisions in our Model Rules. Model Rule 2.1 is not an 
inelegant reiteration of the agency principles of lawyering; it is an 
express departure from them.  
Rule 2.1 departs from agency principles because of the unique 
societal role of attorneys. When a client seeks advice about the 
criminal or civil propriety of his actions, the attorney‘s response often 
determines the client‘s behavior. The societal interest in preventing 
client wrongdoing warrants a departure from agency norms. Counsel 
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must advise clients accurately about the state of the law, without 
being swayed by the client‘s interest in a particular outcome. We 
afford confidentiality to such discussions—at a considerable cost to 
society—to encourage clients to seek legal advice about the propriety 
of their proposed actions. Rule 2.1 requires that counsel exercise 
independent professional judgment in order to enhance the prospects 
that such advice will be accurate. Lawyer independence insists on 
accurate legal advice, not to ensure competent representation of the 
client, but to prevent the client from engaging in criminal and 
fraudulent acts that harm society and third parties.  
The client has a general right to control the representation unless 
and until an issue arises under Rule 2.1. The Rule is implicated when 
in the course of (1) providing advice to the client, or (2) effecting 
nonadvocacy ends for the client, including attorney efforts to 
structure and effect client transactions, an attorney should have  
(3) reason for concern that the client‘s proposed conduct is criminal 
or fraudulent. With respect to the third element, the test is an 
objective one: when the facts and circumstances present reasonable 
grounds for concern or suspicion that the behavior in question might 
be wrongful, the attorney‘s obligations attach under Rule 2.1. In such 
cases, the lawyer must employ her independent professional judgment 
to assess the propriety of the proposed client conduct and report her 
conclusions candidly to the client. When the lawyer is required to 
exercise independent professional judgment under Rule 2.1, the client 
cannot waive compliance with the Rule, although he retains the right 
to terminate the representation. Lawyer independence, therefore, does 
not abolish the client-autonomy or agency notions that form the 
bedrock of modern legal practice. On the contrary, our interpretation 
preserves the basic notions of principal control and identifies those 
narrowly circumscribed instances when client autonomy must give 
way to a larger interest—protection of society and third parties from 
criminal or fraudulent conduct.  
Because the stakes are so high when questions of wrongful 
conduct arise, Rule 2.1 imposes three special conditions—
independence, professional judgment, and candor—on the attorney‘s 
assessment of the proposed conduct. Independence requires analysis 
uninfluenced by client loyalty, and—despite the pull and tradition of 
the agency understanding of legal practice—not a search for ways to 
say yes to the client‘s objectives. For cultural, economic, and 
psychological reasons, independence can present a real challenge for 
counsel.  
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Professional judgment has procedural and substantive elements. 
First, the attorney must gain the information necessary to form a 
judgment about the matter in question, which requires inquiry into the 
facts and circumstances as well as research into the law implicated by 
the facts. Second, the attorney must exercise professional judgment in 
analyzing the facts and law, which consists in developing an 
interpretation that is consistent with the standards accepted by the 
legal community. The attorney can fail on one or both elements. The 
first failing is procedural: a judgment that is factually or legally 
uninformed breaches Rule 2.1. The second standard acknowledges 
that there may be more than one legitimate interpretation of the legal 
authorities that bear on the client‘s proposed conduct. On the other 
hand, the standard is committed to the notion that law is objective 
enough to deem some interpretations unacceptable because they are 
beyond the boundaries of professional judgment. Candor requires that 
the attorney accurately report the product of this independent 
professional judgment to the client.  
Rule 2.1 thus has important implications for transactional lawyers. 
Absent a viable understanding of lawyer independence, the principal 
constraint in the transactional setting is Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits 
counsel from ―knowingly‖ assisting the client in criminal or 
fraudulent behavior. The standard allows, and in some cases 
encourages, willful blindness on the part of counsel, since 
ignorance—even when there is reason for concern about the propriety 
of the act in question—allows counsel to avoid gaining the 
knowledge that would prevent client assistance under Model Rule 
1.2(d). Rule 2.1, on the approach developed here, instead insists that 
an attorney accurately assess the propriety of the client‘s proposed 
transaction when asked, and ask questions, learn more, and accurately 
assess a transaction that counsel has reason to suspect is wrongful 
before providing assistance on such transaction. No other rule of 
lawyering requires this, and Rule 2.1—once understood as a departure 
from agency principles—closes this troubling gap in the law 
governing lawyers.  
In the transactional setting, the lawyer‘s obligation under Rule 2.1 
to inquire into the facts and circumstances is not a general obligation 
of inquiry; it is precisely contoured. The lawyer is obligated to inquire 
under the Rule only if she has reason for suspicion that the client‘s 
proposed transaction is wrongful and the attorney plans to assist the 
client in furthering the matter. Moreover, the client is free to refuse 
the lawyer‘s efforts to investigate the facts and research the law. 
Adequate factual and legal knowledge remains, however, a condition 
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of the lawyer‘s services prior to consummating a transaction that she 
has reason to suspect is criminal or fraudulent. Thus, while the client 
has a right to refuse counsel‘s efforts to learn more, the lawyer who is 
denied such access has no choice but to withdraw from the matter, 
since to proceed in ignorance would violate Rule 2.1.  
The refrain ―Where were the lawyers?‖ asks why lawyers allow 
and sometimes further corporate transactions that are wrongful. The 
―reporting up‖ provisions of Model Rule 1.13 and Sarbanes-Oxley—
the supposed answers to this rhetorical question—solve the problem 
only partially. They require attorney action when the attorney has 
knowledge or awareness of wrongful client behavior. The lawyer-
independence standard proposed here addresses the critical, prior 
question: when do attorneys have an obligation to acquire such 
knowledge? 
The proposed interpretation of Rule 2.1 presents an opportunity for 
states to reform their law on lawyer independence. Nearly every state 
has adopted Rule 2.1, although—if the paucity of court attention is 
any indication—the Rule has had almost no discernable effect on the 
practice of law. If courts and, by extension, the profession continue to 
view Rule 2.1 as a client-protection rule (i.e., as another, largely 
redundant element of the agency vision of lawyering), then the Rule 
will remain dormant. Clients are not likely to complain about their 
attorney‘s lack of independence; third parties are. Lawyer 
independence does not require adoption of a new ethics rule, or 
wholesale revision of ethics principles. Courts can breathe life into 
Rule 2.1 by recognizing the Rule‘s real aim—to protect society and 
third parties, not clients.  
Once we have identified the real constituents served by Rule 2.1, it 
is a short step to recognizing their rights under the Rule. Disciplinary 
authorities should consider grievances against counsel filed by third 
parties harmed by client crime or fraud that could have been 
prevented by the lawyer‘s exercise of independent professional 
judgment. In addition, the doctrines that extend the duty of care from 
attorneys to nonclients enable jurisdictions to recognize third-party 
claims for damages. Questions about whether the lawyer has 
exercised professional judgment are not irretrievably subjective, and 
pose no greater practical challenge to enforcement than the judgment 
standards that inform the competency and duty-of-care standards in 
the disciplinary and liability settings respectively.  
Of course, the greater benefit from changes in the disciplinary and 
liability settings lies elsewhere: in the law offices across the country 
where lawyers will exercise independent professional judgment when 
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required by Rule 2.1. If states are troubled by the corporate scandals 
of recent decades and the passivity of lawyers who counseled these 
corporations and furthered their transactions, the tools of reform are 
well within reach. The states already insist on lawyer independence in 
name; it is now time to insist on it in practice.  
 
